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INTRODUCTION 
1.  Directive 2005/60/EC
1 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML Directive) requires, inter 
alia, EU credit and financial institutions to apply a series of anti-money laundering 
(AML)
2 measures to prevent the use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering (see Annex 1 for further detail on the Directive). 
2.  When complying with these AML measures, credit and financial institutions 
operating in an EU cross-border context generally develop an AML policy at group 
level, as part of their global risk management. In late 2008 and early 2009 the 
Commission services undertook a limited examination on how banks
3 belonging to a 
group of companies comply, as a group, with their obligations pursuant to the AML 
Directive
4 and the difficulties they face (see Annex 2 for further detail on the 
examination and the sources of information). The purpose of the examination was to 
check whether the fragmentation of national regulation and/or supervision poses a 
problem for such compliance at group level. In such a case it could undermine the 
effectiveness of the AML Directive and/or increase the cost of compliance for the 
institutions acting as a group. It could also result in regulatory arbitrage by criminals.  
3.  This paper
5 presents the results of that examination. It (1) compares the legislative 
framework in the AML field with supervisory expectations regarding global AML 
risk management by banks; (2) presents how banks generally comply with AML 
measures at group level; (3) describes the costs of compliance; (4) shows the main 
differences between groups and single institutions, with a particular analysis of the 
information flows within the group; (5) describes the level of stakeholders' 
acceptance of the rules; (6) underlines some consistency issues; and (7) finally draws 
a number of conclusions
6. This paper is also a preparatory step towards the report on 
the application of the Directive that the Commission has to submit pursuant to 
Article 42 of the AML Directive. 
                                                 
1  Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, OJ L 309 of 25.11.2005, p. 15. This Directive has been incorporated into the EEA-
Agreement and is therefore applicable also in Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. References in this 
paper, however, will only be made to the European Union or the European Community. 
2  References to money laundering should be understood as, mutatis mutandis, also referring to terrorist 
financing.  
3  The survey has focused on banking groups. For the purposes of this paper, banks should be understood 
as referring to credit institutions as defined in the Article 3(1) of Directive 2005/60/EC.  
4  Compliance with other AML legislation will also be considered, where relevant, in this report. This 
applies for instance to the regulations imposing financial sanctions to terrorists. .  
5  This report does not reflect the views of the Commission as such, but rather those of its staff only. 
6  The information in this paper is provided to the best of the Commission services' knowledge. 
References to the national legal framework of the Member States are largely based on information 
submitted by Member States. They are provided as examples and for illustrative purposes, with no 
guarantee of being exhaustive or in all cases fully accurate. The Commission services are not 
responsible for any possible factual inaccuracy.   
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1.  THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING RULES VS. GLOBAL RISK MANAGEMENT: A 
PROBLEM? 
4.  AML preventive policy generally assumes that: (i) the application by banking 
institutions of customer due diligence deters criminals from using of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering – thus constituting the main element of 
the preventive policy; (ii) the identification of suspicious transactions by banks and 
their subsequent reporting to specialised authorities
7, further to its deterrent effect, 
assists in the fight against money laundering; (iii) responsible banks able to better 
identify and monitor risks areas (e.g. applying a risk-based approach) will be able to 
deliver results regarding the AML preventive efforts; and (iv) risk assessment and 
management at group level (global risk management) by banks will provide better 
results than segmented management at local level.  
5.  The legislation on AML preventive policy is essentially integrated in the AML 
Directive. This Directive is based on the territoriality principle by requiring EU 
Member States to impose AML preventive obligations on, inter alia, the banking 
institutions established in their territory. These include domestic banks as well as 
subsidiaries and branches of banks located in other EU Member States (or in third 
countries), irrespective of whether the parent institution is already subject to the 
AML requirements of the Member State in which it is located
8. As a result, a bank, 
understood as an economic entity, operating in more than one Member State is de 
iure subject to more than one national AML regime within the EU.  
6.  Although the AML Directive sets a fairly harmonised regime, it only imposes 
minimum harmonization requirements at EU level. This allows for different 
national AML regimes
9 when implementing the AML Directive
10, including 
requirements more stringent that those contained in the AML Directive. In this 
context,  divergent national approaches  to regulation
11 can hinder an effective 
AML preventive effort by banks acting as a group
12 within the EU. With regard to 
                                                 
7  So-called financial intelligence units (FIUs). 
8  This contrasts with the so-called "Home Member State principle" which applies in the banking sector. 
According to this principle, a bank is regulated by the law of its home Member State (normally the one 
which granted the authorisation) as far as prudential requirements are concerned. Branches of a bank 
located in other Member States are included in the prudential supervision of the Home Member State of 
the parent bank. Subsidiaries, on the contrary, are separate legal persons and consequently subject to the 
home Member State supervision of the State in which they have obtained their authorisation. See 
Articles 6 to 28 of Directive 2006/48/EC (the banking directive).  
9  See for instance, Section 2.2 on the treatment of the client and the transaction, as well as Annex 5. 
10  The AML Directive was due to be transposed by Member States by 15 December 2007. Nevertheless, 
some of them have taken a longer time for adapting their AML national legislation to the novelties of 
the new AML Directive. For further information o the infringement cases opened by the European 
Commission for non timely implementation, see the Commission's press releases of 5 June 2008 
(IP/08/860), of 16 October 2008 (IP/08/1522) and of 29 January 2009 (IP/09/159). 
11  Other important threats to a banking institution effective AML policy would notably be: (i) a 
sophisticated (from the risk assessment point of view) customer behaviour; and (ii) standard or 
bureaucratic behaviour of the institutions leading to predictability, in particular resulting from the 
application (either upon the institution decision or upon regulatory request) of a rule-based approach 
rather than a risk-based approach. 
12  See for instance, the de Larosière Group which has recently stated that “for cross-border groups, 
regulatory diversity goes against efficiency and the normal group approaches to risk management and 
capital allocation”. For this Group, such diversity is bound to lead to competitive distortions among 
financial institutions and encourage regulatory arbitrage. De Larosière Group (2009), p.27.  
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the scope of the Directive, divergent approaches appear, for instance, on the 
treatment by Member States of EU banking institutions providing financial services 
to the residents on their territories, but without a physical establishment in the 
Member State of the customer. In most Member States
13 the national AML rules do 
not apply to EU banking institutions
14 providing financial services on their territories 
in a "free provision of services" basis without physical establishment. On the 
contrary, in other Member States
15 the national AML law of the State where the 
customer is located is applicable to EU banks in that situation
16.  
7.  The territoriality principle of the AML Directive is potentially at odds with the Basel 
Committee expectation that banks apply a global AML risk management in terms of 
AML prevention on a groupwide basis, across business lines and geographical 
locations
17. This is, in fact, a legislative requirement in at least fifteen EU Member 
States
18. In other Member States
19, there is no legal obligation for the parent bank to 
develop a consolidated groupwide approach to AML risk management but such 
consolidated approach is de facto encouraged by supervisors. This is also in line with 
the notion of group and the "know-your-structure" principle included in the AML 
directive
20. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that, as a result of the territoriality 
principle of the Directive, these expectations will be supervised locally (i.e. there is 
no structured approach to EU AML supervision, contrary to the prudential 
environment), therefore leading to duplications (see Annex 3 for further detail on 
AML supervision in the EU). 
                                                 
13  BE, BG, DE, DL, EL, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK, UK 
14  The situation will be different for third country institutions providing cross-border businesses or 
services in the EU, without physical presence in the EU. For instance, in DE, a Swiss bank in such a 
situation would need to comply with the German AML law and would be subject to AML supervision 
by the German supervisor. 
15  AT, CY, CZ, EE, ES, HU, LV, NL and SI. 
16  In such a situation, the reporting by banks of suspicious transactions to the FIU leads to a paradoxical 
result: customer due diligence would be conducted according to the rules of the Member State of the 
customer (and in addition according to the EU Member State of the bank) while filing of reports would 
be done to the FIU of the Member State where the bank is situated, as mandated by Article 22 of the 
AML Directive. In this regard, at least two EU Member States (FI, FR) encourage banks in those 
situations to voluntarily file suspicious transactions reports with the FIU of the Member State of the 
customer and at least one Member State (CY) requires such filing. 
17  See generally Basel Committee (2004). 
18  AT, BE, BG, DE, EE, EL, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, PT and SK 
19  CY, CZ, ES, HU, LU (for insurance), NL, MT and UK. In SE there are provisions in the Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority’s (FSA) secondary regulation FFFS 2009:1 (which is directly 
enforceable on all financial institutions and registered companies that it applies to) that one must have a 
consolidated approach over business lines. The provision in FFS 2009:1 does not apply to subsidiaries 
and branches in other jurisdictions, but the FSA encourages if the consolidated approach is applied to 
subsidiaries and branches abroad. 
20  See notably Articles 31(1) and 34(2) of the AML Directive. Although the obligations in these articles 
only concern subsidiaries and branches in third countries, the logic behind both articles is that risk 
management and AML compliance is conducted at group level irrespective of whether the subsidiaries 
or branches are located. Indeed, the Directive implicitly integrates the logic of compliance at group 
level also for subsidiaries and branches located within the EU. While it contains no explicit rules on 
this, the principle can also be inferred from the rules on the sharing of information regarding money 
laundering suspicions reported to the financial intelligence units (Cf. Article 28).   
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8.  In this context, any discrepancies between national AML regimes and supervisory 
practices
21 in a cross-border situation could lead to legal uncertainty and related 
operational problems (or conversely operational advantages for some). Similar 
consequences could arise from the application of national bank secrecy (where 
applicable) and data protection rules.  
2.  COMPLIANCE BY BANKS AT GROUP LEVEL 
9.  Banking institutions with branches and subsidiaries outside their Member State of 
establishment (whether in the EU or outside the EU) are generally organised to 
manage compliance risk
22 as a group, that is: ensuring that the business complies 
with existing legislation and regulation, as well as with internal policies and ethical 
standards. This includes compliance with AML legislation within the EU
23. This is 
consistent with the view that global risk management is more efficient
24: through a 
centralized system, the flow of information allows the central compliance department 
to respond faster and more efficiently in case of suspicious of money laundering; the 
know-how of the parent company can be gradually transmitted to their subsidiaries; 
and economies of scale can be achieved. 
2.1.  Internal organisation
25  
10.  The central role for AML within banks’ organisation is with the anti-money 
laundering officer
26. In most countries, the existence of a MLRO is compulsory by 
law
27. In the case of groups, MLROs will be appointed in each jurisdiction where the 
group is present, if so required – which is usual – by national legislation
28. 
                                                 
21  In its recent report, the de Larosière Group stated that “what seems difficult to contest is that 
fragmentation in supervision has shown to be the source of major dangers.” De Larosière Group 
(2009), p.72. Although this comment has been made with regard to prudential supervision in the context 
of the recent financial crisis, the conclusion could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the AML field. 
22  The Basel Committee defines ‘compliance risk’ as the “risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material 
financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, 
regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organisation standards, and codes of conduct applicable to 
its banking activities.” See Basel Committee (2005), §3. 
23  A recent study conducted for the Commission indicates that trans-national banks (and asset managers) 
have typically implemented the AML Directive provisions on a group basis. See Europe Economics 
(2009), §4.62. These findings are consistent with those of a global survey undertaken by a consultancy 
firm in 2007. In that survey, 94% of the responding internationally active banks from the European 
region reported that they had a global AML policy in place. 49% of those stated that they had a full 
global approach (i.e. AML policies and procedures are developed at global level and implemented as 
consistently as possible worldwide) and 45% reported that they had a hybrid approach (i.e. there is a 
global AML policy but detailed procedures are set at a regional/local level). Only 6% would have a full 
AML local approach. According to this survey, "European banks were significantly more likely than 
those in other regions to apply a global approach, reflecting the high-level and flexible nature of much 
European AML legislation." See KPMG (2007), pp.19 and 52. 
24  Implicit in Basel Committee (2004) and Basel Committee (2005) as regards supervisory expectations. 
Also, information collected by the Commission services from major audit firms supports this opinion. 
25 See  Annex  4 for further detail. 
26  Generally referred to as money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) or money laundering compliance 
officer (MLCO). 
27  For instance, this is the case in at least : AT, BG, DE, EE, EL, FR, LU, MT, PL, SE, SI, SK, UK. 
28  Even if not required, in practice banks prefer to have a local MLRO or at least a local “satellite” of the 
MLRO, who will ac as the key contact for the regulator.  
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Nevertheless, group compliance officers are typically (but not always) appointed at 
group level for the internal control and compliance management.  
11.  The MLRO will normally hold a high position in the firm and be part of the 
compliance function
29 (which normally integrates AML compliance), but the 
MLRO will not necessarily be the head of compliance. The compliance function is 
generally seen as playing an important role in the mitigation of reputational risk for 
the institution
30. Its importance has grown in recent years
31.  
12.  For EU banks, the practice is that head office establishes the internal policies and 
procedures that all the subsidiaries and branches in other EU countries (and in third 
countries) must implement (without prejudice to the compliance with local rules). 
This is consistent with the supervisory expectation
32 and with national legislation 
implementing the AML Directive (as regards third countries)
33. In doing so, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that many large banks apply the “higher of home or 
host” rule to their AML policies and procedures, but recognising that particular local 
nuances in applicable laws, including data protection legislation, must be 
considered
34. Staff of the parent bank periodically revises the implementation of 
these policies and procedures and test the effectiveness of controls. This may include 
visits to the countries concerned.  
13.  Secondly, vigilant front office and operations staff are key to banks' AML policy 
regarding customer acceptance and on-going monitoring for the identification of 
suspicious activity. Their role is supplemented by sophisticated IT solutions (such as 
IT monitoring systems) which are increasingly used by banks (in particular large 
banks) for AML compliance (see below). It is indeed reported that IT solutions are 
seen as (more or less) necessary to fulfil some compliance activities
35 although 
human oversight in this area is still significant
36. In this context, adequate AML 
training (as well as awareness) of staff is particularly necessary if the bank wants to 
be able to play an effective role in preventing money laundering. Banks continue to 
                                                 
29  The expression ‘compliance function’ is used to describe staff carrying out compliance responsibilities, 
without intending to prescribe a particular organisation structure. See Basel Committee (2005), §5.  
30  Therefore, one could also assume that some compliance activity is likely to occur in the absence of 
regulation. See Europe Economics (2009), §3.5. 
31  Drivers of this growth include increased regulatory expectations for specific operational compliance 
activities (notably including AML) and the switching of resources from internal audit to compliance – 
which in essence, focuses effort towards prevention. See Europe Economics (2009), §3.38. Supervisors 
are supporting this trend. See generally Basel Committee (2005) 
32  See Basel Committee (2004), §8. 
33  The Directive requirements concerning the communication of policies and procedures to branches and 
subsidiaries (cf. Article 34) apply only with regard to third countries, not within the EU. In practice, it is 
also applied within the EU.  
34  Information collected by the Commission services from major audit firms. For global firms, the US or 
UK requirements are widely used as core standards, but with more detailed policies and procedures at 
local level reflecting local law. In any event, According to the KPMG 2007 survey, there appears to be 
a greater willingness in Europe to apply global policies and procedures on a more consistent basis, with 
less delegation to local operations. This would reflect the high-level principles-based nature of AML 
requirements in the EU, which makes it easier to design policies and procedures that are flexible enough 
to be implemented outside the home State. It may also reflect the fact that a common legislative 
framework applies in Europe and so many of the European respondents find it feasible and economic to 
implement one set of global policies and procedures. See KPMG (2007, p.20. 
35  Europe Economics (2009), §3.49. 
36  Ibid. §5.40. Also confirmed by KPMG (2007), p.33.  
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report that properly trained staff is the best AML control and this is reflected in the 
continued high spending on training programmes in this field
37.  
14.  The third aspect in the internal organisation is the (internal or external) audit 
function
38 which provides for independent review and test controls after the event. A 
2007 survey
39 showed that independent monitoring and testing of AML systems and 
controls is increasing. It should be noted, in relation to audit, that different national 
laws foresee a particular role for the external audit on the application of the AML 
obligations by banks
40 and several countries
41 the law requires banks’ external 
auditors to report on their AML systems and controls on an annual basis. Concerning 
the audit of a banking group, there do not seem to exist specific rules on the division 
of duties between the auditor at group level and the auditor(s) at subsidiary level. In 
practice, the group auditor will often wish to instruct the subsidiary auditor in order 
to obtain a degree of assurance on the AML provisions at subsidiary level. Particular 
difficulties have already arisen, as shown by anecdotal evidence, regarding access by 
the head office auditor to subsidiaries’ data on reported suspicious transactions to the 
FIUs. Auditors are considered to be third parties under Article 28 of the AML 
Directive and therefore are prevented from accessing to such information. Similar 
difficulties may arise as a result of bank secrecy rules. 
2.2.  Treatment of clients and transactions 
15.  While groupwide internal policies on customer due diligence exist within banking 
groups
42, the central application of identification/verification measures to clients 
and/or customer activity monitoring is not common practice – although banking 
associations tend to consider that such a possibility would be advantageous
43. The 
existence of those internal policies does not result either in a uniform application of 
the internal rules across the group – not least because of the risk-based approach 
introduced by the Directive: the practical application of the customer due diligence 
measures will be adapted to local conditions (and regulations) and no box ticking 
approach followed. 
16.  Hence, the client of one entity within the group is not automatically accepted as 
client of all entities of the group. If necessary, institutions within a group can 
cooperate to create an individual customer dossier but the final result will not be 
automatically shared and is not used to waive the requirements in another 
                                                 
37  The importance of training in the banking sector has also been recognised by the 2002 EU Bank Social 
Partners Joint Declaration on Lifelong learning in the banking sector. 
38  The Basel Committee recommends that the compliance function and the audit function should be 
separate, to ensure that the activities of the compliance function are subject to independent review. See 
Basel Committee (2005), in particular principle 8 (relationship with internal audit). 
39  KPMG (2007), p.21 and seq. 
40  It should not be forgotten that auditors are themselves subject to the AML obligations of the Directive. 
41  At least in BE, DE, ES, LU, PT, SK. 
42  Indeed, the AML Directive requires banks to communicate relevant policies and procedures of customer 
due diligence to branches and (majority owned) subsidiaries. This is explicitly requested with regard to 
branches and subsidiaries in third countries (cf. Article 34) and implicitly with regard to branches and 
subsidiaries within the EU. This is also a supervisory expectation, see Basel (2004), §10 and seq. 
43  Interestingly, the Basel Committee also advanced in 2004 that complementing monitoring of accounts 
and transactions at local level with aggregated monitoring at the centralised site would provide banks 
with the opportunity to monitor for patterns of suspicious activity that cannot be observed from the 
local side. See Basel (2004), §16.   
EN  9     EN 
jurisdiction. Indeed, national requirements may differ as to the level or detail of 
customer due diligence measures to be conducted or as to the approaches to 
information data collection and retention (see Annex 5 for further detail and Section 
4 on the flows of information within the group).  
17.  If a customer is transferred within the group, different situations apply to branches 
and subsidiaries located in the EU. In the case of a branch's customer, a bank may in 
principle rely on already existing identification data held by the branch provided it is 
up-to-date and fulfils the requirements set out in the destination State legislation. 
This is so because the branch is the same legal person as the parent institution, 
therefore rights and obligations are generated by the bank itself. In the case of 
subsidiaries in the EU, normal rules on relations with third parties will apply
44. No 
specific provisions foreseeing a special treatment for customers introduced by/to 
subsidiaries have been enacted by national legislation – though the application of the 
risk based approach and the intra-group information flows could facilitate the 
customer acceptance process in such a situation. 
18.  Politically exposed persons (PEPs) and sanctions lists are two areas where banks are 
making an effort to apply a group policy, though local requirements must also be 
followed. Banks increasingly establish specific procedures to identify (essentially 
relying on commercial lists of PEPs) and monitor PEPs on an on-going basis, with a 
view to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures, as mandated by the 
Directive. Concerning sanctions lists, it appears that, although they can be provided 
by the parent bank, they are as a general rule applied by each bank according to local 
rules. However, many banks would voluntarily apply, to the extent permitted by 
personal data protection legislation, the sanction lists of the countries where they 
operate in order to mitigate risks (see Annex 5 for further detail). 
19.  In cross-border situations, the monitoring of customer activity is conducted directly 
by the institutions at local level, even if policies and procedures are normally 
validated by the parent bank. Banking associations refer to local regulatory 
requirements as a barrier for a further integrated approach (see also section 4 on 
flows of information). Thus, monitoring at group level is only used for subsidiaries 
and branches within the same jurisdiction. Different methods are used by banks for 
customer monitoring. In addition to vigilant staff, there is, despite of the cost, an 
increased use of sophisticated IT monitoring systems allowing for the screening of 
high volumes of transactions (see section 3 on cost of compliance). The human 
resources implications of these systems must not be underestimated (for instance the 
analysis of potentially suspicious transactions, the need to review false positives, 
etc). The challenge for banks is to adapt these systems to the right money laundering 
trends and typologies
45, for which intelligence sharing with the public sector is key 
(see section 5 on acceptability). 
20.  Concerning the analysis of detected transactions, national legislation does not 
contain, in general, provisions requiring that such analysis is conducted at group 
                                                 
44 See  Annex 5 for further detail.  
45  Customer monitoring with a view to identify terrorist financing patterns is particularly difficult, notably 
because of the small value of the associated transactions. In this case, it is reported that enhanced 
transaction monitoring alone is unlikely to prove a solution to these difficulties, which triggers the need 
for increased intelligence sharing between the public and the private sector   
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level and it appears to be largely dealt with at local level. The possibility of 
undertaking such analysis at group level would depend of the possibility to exchange 
information between parent and subsidiaries/branches on suspicions (see section 4). 
The filing of "suspicious transaction reports/suspicious activity reports" with the 
FIUs, follows local laws and procedures. National legislation in EU countries does 
not require the parent bank to report to the FIU (or to the supervisor) of its own 
Member State about reports filed by their branches or subsidiaries in other Member 
States
46. This is normally not done on a voluntary basis either, unless in exceptional 
cases when there is a serious reputational risk for the group (see also Annex 5). 
3.  THE COST OF COMPLIANCE 
21.  The cost of compliance with AML requirements is not insignificant and has 
increased in recent years following the regulatory changes introduced in the EU, 
notably the AML Directive
47. A recent external study has examined for the 
Commission the cost of compliance for certain types of firms within the financial 
industry (notably including banks
48) with six key EU directives in the financial 
services area, including the AML Directive
49. The study focuses on the so-called 
‘incremental compliance costs’ caused by these directives, not on the total costs of 
activities that happens to contribute to regulatory compliance.  
22.  The study identifies separately cost impacts that are of one-off nature (i.e. those costs 
that only have to be incurred once in making the transition, such as IT investment 
and the re-shaping of business processes) from those that are recurring in nature (on-
going costs as a result of regulation). The one-off costs of compliance with the AML 
Directive for banks, financial conglomerates and investment banks roughly account 
for 10% of all their financial services regulatory costs; while in the case of on-going 
costs of compliance, the percentage increases to around 13%.  
23.  The main source of AML related compliance spending is on IT. Concerning the one-
off costs, this included projects designed to: (i) meet the “Know-Your-Customer” 
requirements; (ii) facilitate increased monitoring of suspicious transactions through 
increased automation of processes; (iii) facilitate PEPs screening; and (iv) assist in 
risk assessment. Regarding the on-going costs, most of the IT expenditure is linked 
to access costs to various databases dedicated to the tracking and screening of 
relevant parties such as PEPs, watch lists etc. Whilst some firms (generally larger 
banks) see automation as the only way to provide the necessary evidence of an audit 
                                                 
46  A paradoxical case may arise when the bank has no branch or subsidiary in a State where it provides 
financial services. In such a situation, it would report to the FIU of its own Member State about 
suspicious transactions. See section 1 on this point. 
47 See  Annex 6 for further detail. However, one would also need to consider that the cost of complying 
with AML measures in a non-harmonised environment would be higher. 
48  The study makes no distinction between banks with cross-border activities or local banks, but most of 
the banks surveyed have cross-border activities and would typically have a group compliance policy 
regarding AML requirements.  
49  Europe Economics (2009). The survey concentrated on firms from four sectors within the financial 
services industry in the EU: banks and financial conglomerates, asset managers, investment banks and 
financial markets. The six directives concerned are the so-called Prospectus Directive, the Financial 
Conglomerates Directive, the Capital Requirements Directive, the Transparency Directive, the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive – MiFID and the AML Directive.   
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trail to the regulatory authorities in the event of problems arising (as well as being 
cost effective by comparison to manual effort), a number of firms have retained 
significant (or total) human oversight in this area.  
Training and (for larger banks) external consultants are also important sources of 
costs.  
4.  THE QUESTION OF THE CROSS-BORDER INTRA-GROUP FLOW OF INFORMATION 
24.  When compared to individual banks, banking groups complying with the AML 
Directive at group level do not seem to enjoy particular advantages as regards the 
treatment of the client (see section 2)
50. The main difference for groups, compared to 
individual banks, is the question of the cross-border intra-group flow of data, both 
on the clients and on suspicions.  
25.  Indeed, supervisors attach particular importance to the question of cross-border intra-
group sharing of information, in particular on higher risk customers and activities 
relevant to the global management of reputational and legal risks
51. This question is 
possibly the most difficult one for banks when implementing an AML compliance 
policy at group level. The main reason for this is the balance between the AML 
requirements, on the one hand, and the personal data protection legislation and/or 
banking secrecy regulations, on the other hand (see section 6 on consistency issues).  
26.  The main difficulty applies to the intra-group sharing of information on the customer 
and on the detected suspicious transactions
52, prior to the formalisation of a report to 
the FIU (or the decision not to make one). In principle, national AML legislation 
does not explicitly restrict the intra-group flows of information regarding 
customers for the purposes of applying customer due diligence measures. In 
practice, however, the perception of the banking associations is that, in the majority 
of cases, flows of information within the group with regard to customers would not 
take place due to the requirements resulting from national legislation on data 
protection
53 (or its application) and on banking secrecy (where they exist). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that banking groups tend to overcome these difficulties through 
on-site visits by head office/parent bank staff, who then are able to report back to 
headquarters
54.  
                                                 
50  Concerning the impact on employees, anecdotal evidence provided to the Commission services suggests 
that being part of a group may result in better protection for employees in case of external harassment or 
threat, as employees may be easily moved within the group to another geographical location, if need be. 
51  See Basel Committee (2004), §§17-19. In particular the Basel Committee recommends that the “bank’s 
centralised KYC function should evaluate the potential risk posed by activity reported by its branches 
and subsidiaries and where appropriate assess its world-wide exposure to a given customer.” Ibid. §18. 
52 See  Annex 5 for further detail on this issue. 
53  The protection of personal data is a fundamental right of the person which is expressly laid down in 
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European Convention 
of Human Rights (Art. 8). Legislation adopted by the European Union in the field of data protection 
lays down the principles that the processing of personal data shall comply with in order to respect this 
fundamental right.  
54  This situation does not seem to match the Basel Committee expectations on the removal of "legal 
impediments" to intra-group sharing of information (see Basel Committee (2004), §§24-27, in particular  
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27.  An adequate treatment of suspicious cases within a banking group, aiming at 
determining whether the filing of a suspicious transaction report is necessary, would 
require an information exchange with other entities within the group on the 
suspicious case (as well as on previous suspicious transaction reports established on 
the same customer within the group). Nevertheless, in some Member States
55 this is 
not possible unless a report to the FIU has been previously formalised. In practice, 
according to the banking associations, information on suspicious cases is rarely 
shared within the group: only in exceptional cases, covered by agreements/protocols 
under the control of the parent bank that guarantee confidentiality and secure 
transmission of data. The perception of banking associations in this regard is that 
national data protection and bank secrecy rules would generally prevent the 
circulation of such data between institutions of the same group. 
28.  The possibility of circulating within the banking group information on reports filed 
with the FIUs is provided for in Article 28(3) of the AML Directive
56. However, EU 
FIUs are not enthusiastic about such possibility
57.  
29.  In principle, no restrictions exist for the circulation of information within the banking 
group about trends, typologies or general feedback received from FIUs or other 
public authorities, provided it does not include precise information on clients or their 
transactions related to on-going procedures. The situation concerning feedback on 
on-going particular cases including data on clients and transactions – when 
provided
58– is less clear. Nevertheless, national AML legislation is in most cases 
silent and thus open to interpretation
59. In some cases, circulation of information 
would only be possible with the express authorisation of the FIU
60 – otherwise, the 
information should remain with the AML compliance department of the reporting 
entity
61. In any event, general rules on data protection and bank secrecy would apply. 
                                                                                                                                                         
§27). At the same time, it is unclear whether the Basel Committee took into account in that paper the 
fundamental right dimension of the legislation on the protection of personal data. 
55  FI, PL, SK. In NL, the law requires that the report with the FIU is done immediately. Therefore, de 
facto it is not possible to share information within the group before formalising the report. 
56  Almost all Member States have integrated this provision in national law. One Member State (SI), 
however, decided not to allow for the intra-group disclosures relating to reports filed with the FIU (with 
regard to disclosures between parent bank and subsidiary. However, information flows between branch 
and head office are possible) 
57  See EU FIU Platform (2008a), p.14-16. FIUs also underline that there is a risk of abusing the 
permission for this kind of intra-group exchanges of information and of circumventing other 
prohibitions of disclosure: e.g. in order to circumvent the prohibition to provide information following a 
request by the judicial authorities, banks could disclose the same information to the FIU and then 
pretend to be entitled to circulate the information within the group. Ibid., p.16. See also Annex 5, 
section D iii). 
58  This type of specific feedback is not always provided by FIUs. In some cases, feedback is limited to 
either general feedback or to publicly available information (e.g. outcome of the judicial procedures).  
59  Only in a few countries (DK, HU, LU, LV, SK) national legislation would explicitly allow for the intra-
group circulation of such feedback. On the contrary, in one Member State (NL), legislation explicitly 
foresees that FIU feedback with regard to specific reports cannot be disclosed within the institutions 
belonging to the same group, only the report itself can be.  
60  FIUs are, in general, not too favourable to the disclosure of feedback within the banking group. See EU 
FIU Platform (2008), p.13-14. 
61  BG, CY, FI, RO, UK  
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30.  Concerning  record keeping, banking associations report that, due to regulatory 
requirements
62, information is archived in each local jurisdiction, without connection 
between databases. As a result, centralised archiving at group level of the 
information collected by different Member States is not really possible, although it 
could be an efficient way of ensuring that records are easily retrievable and logged
63.  
5.  ACCEPTABILITY OF AML OBLIGATIONS 
31.  There appears to be a broad support from EU banks (whether acting cross-border or 
not) concerning the EU AML regulatory framework. A recent study conducted for 
the Commission
64 reports that the majority of interviewees viewed the AML 
Directive as useful and effective in deterring money laundering as well as 
maintaining market confidence. This is consistent with the opinions expressed in an 
independent survey conducted in 2007
65. According to this survey, the majority of 
banks in Europe believe that their current legislative and regulatory burden is 
acceptable (although they also state that the content of existing legislation requires 
improvement if money laundering is to be effectively tackled in the region)
66.  
From the cost perspective
67, another study conducted for the Commission
68 shows 
that banks seemed to have successfully integrated the rules into their daily business. 
The majority of the surveyed participants viewed the AML regime as an inevitable 
part of "business as usual"
69. A few believe there would be benefits in being “ahead 
of the game” in this regard (for instance, from the perspective of better managing 
reputational risk). It is noteworthy, however, that a small number of surveyed 
                                                 
62  For instance, in two Member States (ES and SI) the data retention period is longer (6 years) than the 
one foreseen in the Directive (5 years).  
63  This also implies that it is not possible for an institution to organise a centralised system covering 
operations in different Member States in order to comply with the requirements of Article 32 of the 
Directive. There are efficiency arguments in favour of such a centralised system: for instance, a 
centralised system would ensure a consistent approach and the smooth the transfer of knowledge around 
requests for information from local FIUs. At the same time, the key factor is that the information can be 
retrieved quickly, rather than the actual location of the records.  
64  CRA International (2009), p.13 and section 3.7.3. The CRA International study focuses on the Financial 
Services Action Plan of 1999, so that in principle the AML Directive concerned was the one of 2001 
(so-called second AML Directive). However, to the extent that the second AML Directive has been 
repealed in the meantime by Directive 2005/60/EC (so-called third AML Directive), it is difficult to 
disentangle the impacts of the second and the third Directives (see section 3.7) 
65  KPMG (2007), p. 54.  
66  A different survey conducted on UK financial services businesses (not limited to banks), also showed 
that an overwhelming majority of respondents were satisfied or very satisfied their organisation had 
successfully implemented the risk based approach to anti-money laundering requirements. The industry 
perception was also that any organisation that is non-compliant in the AML area is an industry outlier 
and vulnerable to severe regulatory sanction, such as public censure and financial penalties. See PWC 
(2007b), pp.3 and 6. 
67  A previous independent survey conducted in 2007 on UK financial services businesses (not limited to 
banks) showed a negative perception of the cost-benefits derived from the new AML rules to the date of 
the survey. The audit firm which undertook the survey concluded that demonstrating the efficiencies 
that the regime is intended to deliver to businesses would become increasingly challenging. PWC 
(2007b), pp.3-4. 
68  Europe Economics (2009), §5.35. 
69  A not uncommon view would be that its ongoing incremental impact of the Directive would have been 
slight (or even negative) were it not for the broadened scope (to include, for instance, Politically 
Exposed Persons). Ibid.  
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institutions regard the anti-money laundering regime in general as involving costs 
disproportionate to any plausible beneficial effect.  
32.  The flexibility provided by the risk-based approach introduced by the Directive 
seems to be one, if not the main, of the drivers for this level of acceptability, as 
confirmed by the study on cost of compliance
70 and an independent survey
71. It has 
been anticipated
72 that the application of the risk-based approach will lead to even 
greater involvement and responsibility of senior management in AML issues, which 
possibly plays a role in this level of acceptability. At the same time, the application 
of the risk-based approach increases the firm’s responsibility and the consequent 
need for being able to provide to the regulatory authorities the necessary evidence of 
the choices made. This has led some firms (generally large banks) to see automation 
as the only way to demonstrate to the authorities – should a problem arise – that the 
firm had done all that it reasonably could
73.  
33.  Concerning specifically the EU cross-border dimension, this level of acceptability 
is confirmed by the absence of formal or informal complaints with national 
authorities on specific difficulties to apply the AML rules at group level within the 
EU
74. 
34.  Rather than at the AML rules themselves, stakeholders point at their interaction with 
other legislation, such as data protection and bank secrecy rules (see section 6) or at 
the practical application of some of their aspects. Industry points at the need to 
ensure cooperation and intelligence sharing between the private and the public 
sector – which could also be shared at group level. In a recent study conducted for 
the Commission
75, as much as 93% of the interviewees considered feedback to their 
institutions as an essential part of a good AML policy and estimated that more 
substantial feedback is required from FIUs and law enforcement authorities. Such 
feedback should in particular help them in having a clearer understanding of the 
typologies used or the main threats. While providing feedback to banks is an 
obligation contained in the Directive, its practical implementation could be 
improved
76. Indeed, that study concludes that more and better feedback should be 
provided to credit and financial institutions, which should receive a priority treatment 
from FIUs and law enforcement authorities compared to the other entities and 
persons reporting to them. 
                                                 
70  Ibid.  
71  According to the KMPG survey, the broad support for the regulatory framework in Europe is likely to 
be attributable to the flexible, risk-based approach that has been incorporated into the EU AML 
Directive, as well as the degree of consultation that has taken place between the Commission, regulators 
and banks in writing the Directive. See KPMG (2007), p.54.  
72  KPMG (2007), p. 12.-13. According to KPMG, this also raises questions about the level of engagement 
that regulators expect senior management to have in each of the processes underlying the risk-based 
approach, from risk management through to design, implementation and oversight of controls. 
73  Europe economics (2009), §§4.59 and 5.40. 
74  Some Member States (PT,FR) have reported about difficulties met by banking institutions regarding the 
flow of information with their branches and subsidiaries in third countries  
75  See generally B & S Europe (2009). The survey in this study also encompasses non-financial entities or 
persons. See also KPMG (2007), p.36. 
76  The EU FIUs have also underlined the importance of feedback in a recent report. This report provides a 
brief overview of the existing regulatory framework and analyses different types of feedback from the 
FIU perspective. See generally EU FIU Platform (2008b).   
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6.  CONSISTENCY ISSUES 
6.1.  AML supervision 
35.  As explained in §8, there is a risk that decentralised competing supervision of AML 
compliance by banking groups could lead to conflicting supervisory views, although 
in practice, there is no evidence of this happening. Financial services supervisors, in 
particular banking supervisors, are enhancing their cooperation on AML issues, e.g. 
within the AML task force created by CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR. At the same time, 
not all banking supervisors have the power to cooperate and exchange AML related 
information on supervised institutions with foreign authorities tasked with AML 
supervision
77. CEBS has recently recognised that there is a case for initiating further 
work regarding the effectiveness of supervision in the implementation of the AML 
Directive and proposed that the AML task force of CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR takes 
this work forward
78. 
6.2.  AML and data protection 
36.  The link between the AML rules (and supervision) and the data protection rules (and 
supervision) also give rise to problems of consistency. Stakeholders underline the 
need to clarify the interpretation of some data protection rules in the specific 
framework of the prevention of money laundering and to provide the necessary 
guidance. This is also due to the fact that the wording of some provisions of the 
AML Directive, for instance CDD requirements, is not sufficiently precise and leaves 
room for discretion, which may give rise to different interpretations with regard to 
the extent of these obligations and may create uncertainty about the amount and the 
degree of personal information they have to collect to comply with AML 
requirements. 
37.  Different issues have arisen in connection to the intra-group exchange of information 
within the EU
79 (see Annex 7 for further detail). The main difficulties relate to the 
exchange of information on the customer either for the purposes of customer 
acceptance policy or for the customer and transaction monitoring. Stakeholders 
would welcome clarification as to whether a systematic sharing of customer 
information within the group is compatible with data protection legislation, in 
particular with the principles of purpose limitation, necessity, proportionality and 
appropriate legal basis for the processing, or whether a case-by-case justification 
would be needed. In the latter case, stakeholders tend to consider that the customer 
and transaction monitoring at group level would not be practical. This question has 
particular importance given the application of the risk-based approach. In the same 
manner as banks need to demonstrate to the banking supervisors that the extent of the 
customer due diligence measures is appropriate in view of the risk of money 
laundering, banks would also need to justify to the data protection authorities that the 
processing in question, involving intra-group and cross-border transfer of 
information, complies with the data protection principles of necessity, 
                                                 
77 CEBS  (2009),  p.48. 
78  Ibid., p.49. 
79  The transfer of personal data to an entity of the group in a third country poses particular challenges for 
the intra-group sharing of information, such as the question of the adequate level of protection in that 
third country etc. However, this question is beyond the scope of this paper.   
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proportionality, purpose limitation and appropriate legal basis for the processing. 
Also, the legal coverage of the consolidated sanctions lists (e.g. aggregating national 
lists applicable in the countries where the banking group is present) is unclear for 
stakeholders. 
Concerning the intra-group transfer of information on suspicious transactions and on 
reports thereof, a question arises as to whether the absence of prohibition in the 
national legislation transposing the AML Directive is a sufficient legal basis for the 
transfer of data within the banking group from the point of view of data protection 
rules. An additional issue raised in connection to the processing of suspicious 
transactions is that the intra-group circulation of information or the record keeping at 
group level should not amount to blacklisting of a customer. 
38.  Clarifying the interpretation of these issues would also increase the predictability of 
the positions of the data protection authorities in this area. The overall goal should be 
to increase the legal certainty for institutions subject to the AML requirements, so 
that these institutions can effectively exchange information within the group, when 
needed for the prevention of money laundering, whilst complying with data 
protection legislation.  
39.  Nevertheless, it appears that at present, national data protection authorities and 
financial services supervisors do not liaise enough in the AML field. Only in one 
Member State
80 is there a specific code of conduct for the banking sector which 
makes clear how the sector should ensure compliance with data protection rules. It 
has been suggested in this context that there would be an EU added value if 
clarification or guidance is addressed at EU level. Indeed, some preliminary work to 
that end has been undertaken by the Commission services in 2008 within the 
framework of the Article 29 Working Party. Work is still on-going
81. 
6.3.  Bank secrecy rules 
40.  The question of national bank secrecy rules has also been raised. While in principle 
Member States have committed to make sure that bank secrecy rules do not inhibit 
implementation of AML rules
82, in practice some difficulties remain. Difficulties 
relate, for instance, to the sharing of information on the customer and the suspicion 
before making a report to the FIU
83. In some Member States
84 banks may not 
disclose information covered by the bank/professional secrecy rules (e.g. obtained in 
the course of a business relationship) to its parent company/subsidiary
85 if the 
                                                 
80 NL. 
81  A consultation paper prepared by the Commission services on Processing of personal data and the EU 
anti-money laundering rules was submitted to the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. This 
Working Party, created by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
82  See Recommendation 4 of the FATF, endorsed by EU Member States: "Countries should ensure that 
financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit implementation of the FATF recommendations". 
83  Article 28(3) of the AML Directive waives any bank secrecy rule opposing to the sharing of data once 
the report made. 
84  AT, BG, FR, MT, PT, SI 
85  National rules generally prohibit disclosure to “third parties”. In this regard, it is difficult to consider 
that a branch is a third party to the head office of the same institution. As a result, the bank secrecy rules  
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information is on a customer who is not under suspicion, unless the customer 
consents to this
86. In other Member States, disclosure is possible only if justified by 
the "need-to-know" principle
87 or if equivalent rules on bank secrecy are in force in 
the destination State
88.  
41.  Nevertheless, the bank secrecy rules in some Member States explicitly provide for 
intra-group flows of information for the purposes of money laundering prevention
89 
or do not constitute an obstacle to them
90. In other Member States
91 there are no bank 
secrecy rules in national legislation, but a confidentiality duty arises from the 
contractual obligation between customer and bank. Still, it might be possible that in 
some jurisdictions
92 disclosure of information within a group, where this involves 
disclosure to a separate company, may constitute a breach of secrecy.  
CONCLUSIONS 
42.  This paper shows that, despite the minimum harmonisation nature of the AML 
Directive, the degree of convergence across Member States AML rules applying to 
banks is relatively high
93. Nevertheless, national regulatory differences remain in 
certain areas. This is the case, for instance, regarding: (i) the scope of national 
legislation which applies to banks established in other EU Member States and 
providing financial services cross-border in a "free provision of services" basis 
without establishment (see §6); (ii) the level or detail of customer due diligence 
measures to be conducted, such as the formalities and requirements on customer 
identification or the requirements for simplified/enhanced customer due diligence 
(see §16 and Annex 5); or (iii) differences regarding the extent of data that can 
circulated within the banking group (see section 4 and Annex 5). Nevertheless, the 
main AML-related barriers to banks' undertaking cross-border business and applying 
an AML policy at group level will often be of practical rather than of legal nature. 
43.  Some uncertainties remain, in particular, regarding the interaction of AML rules with 
national data protection rules and with bank secrecy rules (see sections 6.2, 6.3, and 
Annex 7) and their impact on banks' AML policies at group level, especially 
regarding the information flows within the group. In this context, the Commission 
services have launched exploratory work with the EU data protection authorities 
within the so-called Article 29 Working Party with a view to achieve more clarity, at 
                                                                                                                                                         
would not apply to intra-institution flows of information, even if cross-border. They would, on the 
contrary apply to the relation parent bank-subsidiary.  
86 PT,  SI. 
87 DK. 
88 FI. 
89  CY, HU (if written consent of the customer), LU, RO, SE. 
90  CZ, EE, ES, IE (based on common law, not statutory rules), PL, SK 
91  BE, DE. IT, NL, UK 
92 NL,  UK. 
93  See also KMPG (2007), p.20: "In Europe, there appears to be a greater willingness to apply global 
policies and procedures on a more consistent basis, with less delegation to local operations. This is 
likely to reflect the high-level principles-based nature of AML requirements in this region, which makes 
it easier to design policies and procedures that are flexible enough to be implemented outside the home 
country. It may also reflect the fact that a common legislative framework applies in Europe and so 
many of the European respondents find it feasible and economic to implement one set of global policies 
and procedures".  
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EU level, on the interrelations between AML rules and data protection rules. Work is 
still on-going. 
44.  This paper also shows that promoting further convergence between EU supervisors 
on supervisions of banks' compliance with the AML rules is desirable (see section 
6.1). Indeed, CEBS recently concluded that there is a case for further work within the 
AML task force of CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS on the effectiveness of supervision in 
the implementation of the AML Directive
94. The importance of supervision to 
promote, inter alia, integrity in the financial system was recently recalled by the 
Group of Twenty (G-20)
95.  
                                                 
94 CEBS(2009),  p.49 
95  Group of Twenty (2009a), §13 and seq.  
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ANNEX 1 – THE AML DIRECTIVE 
Directive 2005/60/EC
96 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering and terrorist financing (the "AML Directive") requires, inter alia, credit 
and financial institutions to apply a series of preventive measures with a view to prevent 
money laundering and terrorist financing.  
The main obligations resulting from the AML Directive are the following: 
(1)  Customer due diligence (CDD). Credit and financial institutions should apply CDD 
measures when establishing a business relation with a client (and also in other 
circumstances, see Article 7). Customer due diligence measures – also referred to as 
"know your customer" (KYC) – imply (Article 8): (i) the identification of the customer 
and verification his/her identity; (ii) the identification of beneficial owner (where 
applicable); (iii) obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship; and (iv) conducting on going monitoring of the business 
relationship. CDD measures may be adapted depending on the risk perceived (risk-
based approach). The Directive mandates or allows for simplified CDD (Article 11): 
mandated when the client is a credit or financial institution and allowed in cases 
decided nationally in accordance with the cases or conditions set out in the Directive 
or its implementing legislation
97. The Directive also requires the application of 
enhanced CDD in certain cases (Article 13), namely regarding: non-face to face 
situations; relationships with politically exposed persons (PEPs), and correspondent 
banking relationships with banks in third countries). In some cases the Directive 
allows for the performance of CDD measures by third parties under certain conditions 
(Articles 14 to 19). Failure to satisfy the CDD requirements should imply that no 
business relationship is entered into (Article 9). The Directive is worded in relatively 
broad terms which may give rise to different interpretation and application of the 
requirements of this obligation. 
(2)  Reporting obligations. Credit and financial institutions are required to inform the 
national financial intelligence units (FIUs) of transactions/situations where there is a 
suspicion that money laundering is being or has been committed or attempted (Article 
22). Concerned transactions should, as a matter of principle, not be carried out before 
filing the report (Article 24). Credit and financial institutions should not disclose to the 
customer (so-called prohibition of tipping off) that a report has been filed with the 
relevant FIU. They should not disclose this fact to third parties either, except when 
authorised by the directive (Article 28). FIUs may request the credit and financial 
                                                 
96  Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, OJ L 309 of 25.11.2005, p. 15.   
See: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/financial-crime/index_en.htm  
See also the summary of this Directive in Scadplus: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24016a.htm 
97  Directive 2006/70/EC of the European Commission of 1 August 2006 laying down implementing 
measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the 
definition of politically exposed person and the technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence 
procedures and for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very 
limited basis, OJ L 214, 4.8.2006, p.29. 
 See:  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/financial-crime/index_en.htm   
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institutions to provide additional information (Article 22). Disclosure in good faith 
should not constitute a breach of any legislative obligation and should not imply 
liability of any kind (cf. Article 26). Credit and financial institutions' employees 
making suspicious reports should be protected from threat and hostile action (cf. 
Article 27). 
(3)  Record keeping. Credit and financial institutions should keep documents and 
information relating to the above for at least 5 years (Article 30). Additionally, credit 
and financial institutions should have systems in place that enable them to reply fully 
and rapidly to enquiries from FIUs or other authorities as to whether they maintain or 
have maintained during the previous 5 years a business relationship with specified 
legal or natural persons and on the nature of the relationship (Article 32). 
(4)  Internal policies and procedures. Credit and financial institutions should establish 
adequate and appropriate policies and procedures of customer due diligence, reporting, 
record keeping, internal control, risk assessment, risk management, compliance 
management and communication (Article 34). 
(5)  Awareness and training. Credit and financial institutions should take appropriate 
measures so that their relevant employees are aware of the provisions in force on the 
basis of this directive, including participation in training programs (Article 35). 
(6)  Supervision. Credit and financial institutions should be supervised on their compliance 
with the directive rules (Article 37). There are penalties for lack of compliance 
(Article 39).  
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ANNEX 2 – THE EXAMINATION 
The Commission services undertook in late 2008 and early 2009 a limited examination on 
compliance at group level with the AML Directive by banking institutions.  
This survey included an information-gathering exercise involving selected stakeholders:  
•  Member States AML authorities were consulted through the Committee for the Prevention 
of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing referred to in Article 41 of the AML 
Directive. All Member States replied to the questionnaire. 
•  National financial services supervisory authorities were also contacted through the Anti-




100. 11 national supervisors from the 
following countries provided replies to the questionnaire on supervisory issues: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands and 
Slovenia. Results of own research undertaken by the AMLTF has also been used, where 
appropriate. 
•  The following associations representing credit institutions have also provided replies to a 
questionnaire or expressed their opinion on the survey
101: EBIC (European Banking 
Industry Committee), EBF (European Banking Federation) EAPB (European Association 
of Public Banks), ESBG (European Savings Banks Group), EACB (European Association 
of Cooperative Banks), and BBA (British Bankers Associations). Some individual banks 
also provided comments to the Commission services. 
•  The European Contact Group representing large audit firms active in auditing credit and 
financial institutions. Members of two large networks of auditing firms replied to the 
specific questionnaire, covering in aggregate, a large number of Member States: Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
                                                 
98  The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) was created by Commission Decision 
2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, OJ L 3, 
7.1.2004, p. 28. In the meantime, Decision 2004/5/EC has been repealed by Commission Decision 
2009/78/EC of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, OJ L 25, 
29.1.2009, p. 23. See www.c-ebs.org  
99  The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) was created by Commission Decision 
2001/527/EC of 6 June 2001 establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, OJ L 191, 
13.7.2001, p.43. In the meantime, Decision 2001/527/EC has been repealed by Commission Decision 
2009/77/EC of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, OJ L 
25, 29.1.2009, p. 18. See: www.cesr.eu  
100  The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) was created 
by Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, OJ L 3, 7.1.2004, p. 30. In the meantime, Decision 
2001/527/EC has been repealed by Commission Decision 2009/79/EC of 23 January 2009 establishing 
the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, OJ L 25, 29.1.2009, p. 
28. See www.ceiops.eu  
101  This survey also builds on previous exchanges during 2007 and 2008 between the Commission services 
and the associations representing credit institutions.  
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•  Member States data protection authorities were contacted through the so-called Article 29 
Working Party
102. The work of the Article 29 Working Party is still on-going.  
The Commission services also used the results of two studies recently commissioned by the 
Commission (DG Internal Market and Services) regarding the application of financial services 
measures. The first one is a study on the impact of the FSAP
103. The second one is on the cost 
of compliance with selected FSAP measures, notably including the AML Directive. This 
second study is largely based on individual interviews with credit and financial institutions, 
including around 40 banks and financial conglomerates and 18 investment banks.  
Other publicly available information has been used for the preparation of this document, such 
as publications from: the Commission and advisory bodies to the Commission; national 
supervisors; the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and similar international bodies; 
the FATF; financial services industry; leading international consultancy firms etc (see below 
list of References for further detail).  
                                                 
102  The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party was created by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/index_en.htm  
103 See  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/actionplan/index_en.htm .  
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ANNEX 3 – SUPERVISION ON AML COMPLIANCE BY BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE EU 
A) Supervisory expectations on global risk management by banks 
Global risk management, including AML risk, by banks is a clear supervisory 
recommendation. For instance, the Basel Committee
104, which is the leading international 
body in this regard
105, considers that the adoption of effective "know-your-customer" (KYC) 
standards is an essential part of banks' risk management practices, as banks with inadequate 
KYC risk management programmes may be subject to significant risks, especially legal and 
reputational risk
106. The Basel Committee recognises in this regard that a key challenge in 
implementing KYC policies and procedures is how to put in place an effective groupwide 
approach, since those risks are global in nature. As a consequence it underlines that "it is 
essential that each group develop a global risk management programme supported by 
policies that incorporate groupwide KYC standards. Policies and procedures at the branch- 
or subsidiary-level must be consistent with and supportive of the group KYC standards even 
where for local or business reasons such policies and procedures are not identical to the 
group's"
107. 
For the Basel Committee, "Consolidated KYC Risk Management means an established 
centralised process for coordinating and promulgating policies and procedures on a groupwide 
basis, as well as robust arrangements for the sharing of information within the group. […] 
Similar to the approach to consolidated credit, market and operational risks, effective control 
of consolidated KYC risk requires banks to coordinate their risk management activities on a 
groupwide basis across the head office and all branches and subsidiaries."
108 The four 
essential elements of sound KYC programme would be: risk management, customer 
acceptance policy, procedures for customer identification and process for monitoring its 
accounts. 
The Basel Committee notes that KYC involves in most cases the liabilities rather than the 
assets side of the balance sheet, as well as balances that are carried as off-balance sheet items. 
For an appropriate risk management process, the Basel Committee sees it essential, in 
conducting effective monitoring on a groupwide basis, that "banks be free to pass information 
about their liabilities or assets under management, subject to adequate legal protection, back 
to their head offices or parent banks"
109. In this connection, the Basel Committee called on 
                                                 
104  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking supervisory authorities which 
was established by the central bank Governors of the G-10 countries in 1975. It is made up of senior 
representatives of banking supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The permanent secretariat is located at the Bank for International Settlements in 
Basel. See www.bis.org.bcbs.index.htm  
105  The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) have also addressed the money laundering problem. To the extent that 
this paper is focusing on banking groups, IOSCO and IAIS guidance and recommendations will not be 
addressed in this paper. For a summary view of IOSCO and IAIS work in the AML field, see the Joint 
Forum (2005).  
106  Basel Committee (2004). 
107  Ibid. §3. 
108  Ibid. §4. 
109  Ibid. §5.  
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jurisdictions to facilitate consolidated KYC risk management by providing an appropriate 
legal framework which allows the cross-border sharing of information.
110 
B) Non-transparent jurisdictions and the "know-your-structure" principle 
Particular challenges regarding global AML risk management appear in connection with the 
activities of subsidiaries and branches of credit institutions in jurisdictions which lack or 
impair transparency
111. Operating in such jurisdictions, particularly when performing certain 
services or establishing opaque structures on behalf of customers, pose financial, legal and 
reputational risks to the banking organisation, impede the ability of the board of directors and 
senior management to conduct appropriate business oversight and hinder effective banking 
supervision.
112 These non-transparent jurisdictions furthermore constitute a threat to the 
stability and reputation of the financial system as a whole. In its declaration of 15 November 
2008 the Group of Twenty (G-20), in order to promote integrity in financial markets, called 
on national and regional authorities to implement national and international measures to 
"protect the global financial system from uncooperative and non-transparent jurisdictions 
that pose risks of illicit financial activity".
113 In a recent communication, the Commission 
suggested that "a list of uncooperative jurisdictions should be drawn up together with a 
toolbox of joint measures for use against them in the areas of supervision, anti-money 
laundering, terrorist financing and taxation". It further suggested that banks should be 
dissuaded from operating in off-shore centres through increased prudential requirements and 
tougher transparency rules
114. The Group of Twenty, in April 2009, further stated that "it is 
essential to protect public finances and international standards against the risks posed by 
non-cooperative jurisdictions" and called on all jurisdictions "to adhere to the international 
standards in the prudential, tax and AML/CFT areas"
115. The Group of Twenty also agreed 
that the FATF should revise and reinvigorate the review process for assessing compliance by 
jurisdictions with AML/CFT standards.  
In this connection, the Basel Committee has stressed the importance of the "know-your-
structure" principle in the banking sector with a view to mitigate the risks arising from the 
activities of banks in non-transparent jurisdictions which potentially impede effective 
supervision
116. It first recommends that the board and senior management should understand 
the bank's operational structure, particularly where the bank operates in jurisdictions that 
impede transparency.  
The Basel Committee further recommends that the board of directors and senior management 
should conduct an enhanced level of due diligence where a bank operates in jurisdictions that 
reduce transparency and potentially impede effective supervision. In this regard, it 
recommends that banks should have appropriate policies and procedures in place, inter alia, 
to: regularly evaluate the need to operate in jurisdictions that reduce transparency; identify 
and manage all material risks, including legal and reputational risks, arising from such 
                                                 
110  Ibid. §6. 
111  This could include offshore financial centres and onshore jurisdictions in which a lack of transparency 
and weak enforcement mechanisms foster opacity and hinder effective management and supervision. It 
is assumed that those non-transparent jurisdictions are outside the EU. 
112  Basel Committee (2006), §52, 53. 
113  Group of Twenty (2008) 
114  European Commission (2009), p.17. 
115  Group of Twenty (2009b).  
116  Basel Committee (2006), §§ 52 to 56 (Principle 8)  
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activities; set forth clear corporate governance expectations and responsibilities for all 
relevant entities and business lines within the banking organisation; oversee the regular 
assessment of compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, as well as the bank's own 
internal policies; ensure that these activities are within the scope of regular head office 
internal controls, as well as external audit reviews; or ensure that information regarding these 
activities and associated risks is readily available to the bank's head office and is appropriately 
reported to the board of directors and supervisors.
117 
The know-your-structure principle has been – to some extent – included, for banking 
institutions, in the EU directive relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions
118. 
C) The notion of group in the Directive: beyond the "know-your-structure” principle 
The notion of group is, however, not foreign to the AML Directive, on the contrary. In the 
first place, Article 34(2) integrates the "know-your-structure" principle by requiring credit and 
financial institutions covered by the Directive to communicate to their branches and majority 
owned subsidiaries located in third countries (irrespective of whether these jurisdictions 
impede or reduce transparency) their relevant internal policies and procedures in this area. 
These policies and procedures should relate
119 to "customer due diligence, reporting, record 
keeping, internal control, risk assessment, risk management, compliance management and 
communication in order to forestall and prevent operations related to money laundering or 
terrorist financing". Additionally, this principle is further developed in Article 31(1) which 
requires credit and financial institutions covered by the Directive to apply in their branches 
and majority owned subsidiaries located in third countries, measures at least equivalent to 
those laid down in the EU AML Directive with regard to customer due diligence and record 
keeping. This second requirement results in a de facto "exportation" of the EU rules, indeed 
beyond the "know-your-structure" principle.  
Although the obligations in Articles 31(1) and 34(2) of the Directive only concern 
subsidiaries and branches in third countries, the logic behind both articles is that risk 
management and AML compliance is conducted at group level irrespective of where the 
subsidiaries or branches are located. Indeed, the Directive implicitly integrates the logic of 
compliance at group level also for subsidiaries and branches located within the EU. It contains 
no explicit rules on this, but the principle can be inferred from the rules on the sharing of 
information regarding money laundering suspicions reported to the financial intelligence 
units. Article 28(3) of the Directive waives the tipping-off prohibition in order to allow for 
information sharing within credit and financial institutions belonging to the same group of 
                                                 
117  Ibid. §56. Regarding particularly the question of internal controls, the Basel Committee states that 
"[t]he board and senior management can enhance their effectiveness by requiring that internal control 
reviews include not only "core" banking businesses, but also activities conducted in jurisdictions […] 
that lack transparency. These reviews should include, for instance, regular inspection visits by internal 
auditors, review of activities to ensure that they are in line with their initial intended purpose, review of 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and assessment of legal and reputational risks 
arising from those activities or structures. […] and management should ensure that the board is 
notified of the existence and management of any significant risks that are identified.", Ibid. §55. 
118  See Articles 73(3) and 22 as well as Annex V of Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
(recast), OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p.1. 
119 Cf.  Article  34(1).  
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companies
120. It is implicit in this Article that such sharing of information within the group is 
needed in order to apply a consolidated risk (including AML risk) management policy at 
group level. In this context, Article 28(3) of the Directive provides a definition of group of 
credit and financial institutions for the purpose of sharing information, which one could 
extrapolate for any application of the principle of compliance at group level across the 
Directive. This definition is by reference to Article 2(12) of Directive 2002/87/EC:
121 "'group 
shall mean a group of undertakings, which consist of a parent undertaking, its subsidiaries 
and the entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation, as 
well as undertakings linked to each other by a relationship within the meaning of Article 
12(1) of Directive 83/349/EEC".
122 
D) Supervision of AML compliance in the EU: consolidated or concurrent 
The AML Directive requires that national competent authorities supervise compliance of 
credit and financial institutions with the requirements of this Directive and that competent 
authorities are granted adequate powers and resources in this regard
123. Almost all banking 
supervisory authorities (CEBS members) in the EU have been given the objectives (solely or 
as a shared responsibility) of protecting banks' clients from misconduct and/or bad business 
practices and of preventing financial crime, including anti-money laundering
124. However not 
all of them have the power to monitor compliance with the AML Directive: twenty-one 
banking authorities (AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, FI, FR, HU, IE, LV, LU, MT, NL, 
PT, RO, SE, SI and UK) possess this power while two authorities (DK, ES) do not and four 
(IT, LT, PL and SK) do not possess it fully
125.  
Supervision of AML compliance in the EU: organisational structure  
                                                 
120 " 3. The prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 shall not prevent disclosure between institutions from 
Member States, or from third countries provided that they meet the conditions laid down in Article 
11(1), belonging to the same group […]." 
121  Directive 200/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a 
financial conglomerate; OJ L 35, 11.2.2003, p.1. Consolidated text available at:   
www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0087:20050413:EN:PDF  
122  The seventh Company Law Directive on consolidated accounts. Article 12(1) of this Directive states: 
"1. Without prejudice to Articles 1 to 10, a Member State may require any undertaking governed by its 
national law to draw up consolidated accounts and a consolidated annual report if:   
(a) that undertaking and one or more other undertakings with which it is not connected, as described in 
Article 1(1) and (2), are managed on a unified basis pursuant to a contract concluded with that 
undertaking or provisions in the memorandum or articles of association of those undertakings; or  
(b) the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of that undertaking and of one or more other 
undertakings with which it is not connected, as described in Article 1(1) or (2), consists for the major 
part of the same persons in office during the financial year and until the consolidated accounts are 
drawn up."   
Consolidated text available at:   
www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1983L0349:20070101:EN:PDF  
123  Cf. Article 37.  
124  CEBS (2009), §39 and seq.. Only in ES this is not the case: the AML supervisor is the FIU, which is 
administratively attached to the banking supervisor (ibid, §43). 
125  In many cases (ES, LU, MT, PL and SK) the FIU is also a competent authority in respect of monitoring 
compliance with the AML Directive and in IT the Financial and Economic Police possess this power. In 
MT, the banking supervisor powers regarding AML are delegated by the FIU. See CEBS (2009), §173 
(references regarding DE, FI, MT, RO, SE and SK have been updated on the basis of information 
provided by national authorities).  
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There are different models across the EU for the supervision of credit and financial institutions. For 
instance, in AT, BE, BG, EE, HU, IE, FI, LV, SE, SK and the UK there is one supervisory authority 
which covers all or most credit institutions as well as the prudential and market conduct supervision, 
including the supervision on AML. In other Member States such as CY, EL, FR, IT, LT, LU and RO 
one can identify a sectoral division and/or a division of tasks based on prudential vs. market conduct 
supervision. If there is a sectoral division, then the AML responsibility lies with the supervisor 
responsible for the respective sector. Where there is a division based on prudential vs. market conduct 
supervision, the responsibility for AML lies in most cases with the prudential supervisor.  
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this principle. An example of such exception is DE where the 
central bank (Bundesbank) assists the financial supervisory authority (BaFin) in the prudential 
banking supervision, while BaFin is an integrated supervisory authority covering all credit and 
financial institutions with regard to prudential and market conduct supervision. Featuring a cross-
sectoral AML group, BaFin has the exclusive responsibility for the AML supervision of the financial 
sector. Another exception is NL where a combination exists of a sectoral division and a division in 
prudential vs. market conduct. The supervision regarding AML lies with the supervisor who has the 
licensing authority for a credit and financial institution. In ES, a dedicated commission for the 
prevention of money laundering has been set up. This commission has two supporting bodies, namely 
a secretariat and the executive office, the latter acting as both the Spanish FIU and as AML 
supervisor. Having said this, the Spanish prudential supervisors will focus on reviewing the “know-
your-customer” (KYC) prudential standards and report their findings to the executive service of the 
dedicated commission. In BG, besides the Central Bank the the Financial Supervision Commission, 
AML supervision in the banking and financial sector is conducted by the FIU as well.  
Source: CEBS and information provided by national authorities. 
The Directive, however, does not set up rules regarding the supervision of groups with 
institutions established in more than one Member States. As a result, in all Member States, 
locally established subsidiaries or branches of credit and financial institutions from other 
Member States (as well as from third countries) are subject to local AML supervision like the 
local credit and financial institutions
126. At the same time, despite the absence of a clear 
framework in the AML Directive regarding supervision on AML compliance by groups, in 
almost all Member States (if not all), AML supervision carried out by the supervisory 
authority of the parent institution encompasses the branches and subsidiaries
127 located in 
other EU Member States. In some Member States, such as FR or DE, this is an explicit legal 
requirement, while in other Member States, such as IE, it is the result of supervisory guidance. 
In other Member States, such as BE, EL, NL or the UK, the focus of the supervisory authority 
is on the head office and its senior management responsible for ensuring that their foreign 
branches and subsidiaries are complying with the group AML standard. The obvious result is 
that more than one national supervisor may intervene for the same group in different 
countries, thus making duplications (and potentially divergences) possible.  
Additionally, competent supervisors for AML issues may have different nature: in a few 
instances they are not the same as those tasked with "prudential" supervision (see also 
                                                 
126  Some Member States, such as BE, may however address differently branches and subsidiaries from 
non-EU credit and financial institutions compared to branches and subsidiaries from EU institutions. In 
the second case, AML supervision would be more specialised and focused and not integrated with 
prudential supervision (to be conducted by the Home Member State) 
127  This does not imply that the supervisor of the parent institution will be able to directly impose 
enforceable requirements on its subsidiaries abroad.  
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above)
128. According to CEBS, twenty-one EU banking supervisors have the power to carry 
out AML supervision also on a consolidated basis for banks
129. 
How the supervision is integrated into the supervisory approach? 
In several Member States, such as AT, BE, FR, IE, LT, LU, PT, SK and RO, the AML supervision is 
integrated into prudential supervision. In other Member States, such as BG, CY, EL, FI, HU, LV, NL 
and SE, the AML supervision forms part of the prudential supervision, but is also performed as a 
separate supervisory task. As a result thereof, specific on-site visits concerning AML may be planned 
separately. In ES, the supervision of KYC prudential standards is performed by the sectoral 
supervisors, while AML supervision is performed by the specialised AML supervisor. In IT, while 
sectoral supervision have the competence to conduct general AML supervision, the FIU performs 
checks on compliance with the obligation to report suspicions.  
For instance, in BG, CY, EL, FR, HU, LU, LV, NL and SE specific arrangements in place for AML 
supervision may include: dedicated competent departments; specific planning and separate on-site 
inspections; as well as, in some cases, the requirement that the annual risk assessment of supervised 
institutions include observations relating to AML issues.  
Source: CEBS and information provided by national authorities. 
This complexity also appears in the Basel Committee recommendations in this regard. For the 
Basel Committee, in a cross-border context, home country supervisors should face no 
impediments (in particular by local bank secrecy laws) in verifying a branch or subsidiary's 
compliance with groupwide KYC polices and procedures during on-site inspections. The 
Basel Committee also underlines that the host country supervisor retains responsibility for the 
supervision of compliance with local KYC regulations (which would include an evaluation of 
the appropriateness of the procedures)
130. In order to overcome this complexity, the Basel 
Committee recommends two lines of action:
131 firstly, supervisors should ensure that there is 
appropriate internal reporting and communication from the branch/subsidiary to the board of 
the parent bank, and viceversa, in respect of all material risk and other issues which may 
affect the group (e.g. groupwide "know-your-structure"); and secondly, banking supervisors 
should cooperate and share information with other supervisors to enhance supervisory 
effectiveness and reduce supervisory burden.  
Supervisory authorities in the EU have also addressed this problem. On the one hand, they 
have arrangements and practices in place for cooperation and exchange of information among 
them
132. The exchange of information is permitted in many (but not in all) cases, but restricted 
                                                 
128  On this issue, see generally de Larosière Group (2009), in particular annex III to that report. 
129  AT, BE, BG, CY, DE, EE, EL, FI, FR, HU, IE, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI and UK. On the 
contrary, DK, ES and LT do not have the power and CZ, IT and SK share the power with the FIU. See 
CEBS (2009), §176 (references regarding FI and SK has been updated on the basis of information 
provided by national authorities). 
130  Basel Committee (2004), §21. 
131  Basel Committee (2006), §63. 
132  According to CEBS, of the EU banking supervisors, eighteen authorities (AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, EE, 
EL, FI, FR, IT, LT, LV, NL, PT, RO, SE, SI and UK) have the power of cooperating and exchanging 
information with foreign authorities tasked with AML. Nevertheless BE and RO indicated that they will 
share information with foreign supervisors, i.e. for purposes of conducting their supervisory role and 
AT mentioned that it is bound by law with certain restrictions. Parallel with the cooperation and 
exchange of information on a national basis, DK, ES and MT do not have this power internationally (in 
MT, the power lies with the FIU). In addition, several authorities (BG, HU, IE, LU, PL and SK) do not 
fully possess the power to cooperate and exchange information with foreign authorities tasked with  
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to when it fits the purpose of the assignment and provided it is kept confidential. 
Arrangements are not necessarily AML specific but through different prudential instruments. 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the way the supervision is structured, many Member 
States supervisory authorities have conducted on-site visits to other EU countries (and 
beyond). This supervisory cooperation within the EU has been reinforced by the creation of a 
dedicated anti-money laundering task force by the so-called level 3 committees (CEBS, CESR 
and CEIOPS)
133. 
Specific tools used for AML supervision 
Various tools are used across Member States for supervision in the AML area. As required by the 
AML Directive (cf. Article 37(3)), all Member States supervisory authorities perform on-site 
inspections with respect to AML. Some of them (such as BG, CY, EE, EL, FI, UK) have adopted a 
risk based approach to supervision, which implies that all firms are subject to a “baseline monitoring” 
and that the nature and intensity of a supervisory’s relationship depends on the assessment performed 
by the supervisor. The purpose of the inspections is to determine the compliance with legislation 
regulating the prevention of money laundering; assessing the effectiveness of the internal control 
systems concerning customer identification procedures; risk management; the KYC principle; 
monitoring and reporting of suspicious transactions; record keeping and staff training. These on-site 
visits may form part of regular on-site inspections, have a specific integrity scope or form a follow up 
to specific cases. In some Member States, such as BG, DE, FI, FR, IE, NL, PT, SE and the UK 
thematic AML inspections are also being conducted. Almost all authorities have issued internal 
manuals for prudential supervisors’ use for on-site inspections. A special section in these manuals is 
specific to AML. Otherwise, detailed checklists or questionnaires are also being used to guide 
examiners. 
Aside from on-site visits, most Member States supervisory authorities also use additional off-site 
tools. In Member States such as CY, EL and LU the annual activity report drawn up by the designated 
money laundering officer has to be sent to the supervisory authority and, as the case may be, also to 
the company’s auditor. In AT and DE, the supervisory authority receives a certified annual report and 
in FR and SK an internal control report with information on AML. In FR, banks should also fill in a 
questionnaire prepared by the supervisor allowing to have a detailed description of the AML 
framework of the banks concerned. In ES, regulations require banks to present independent expert 
reports annually. Other examples of off-site tools are: (annual) questionnaires, self assessments, 
statistics, training programmes and a web tool which serves as a comparison of compliance and 
awareness between different types of institutions. In addition, in some Member States (such as BG, 
EL, FI, FR) regulation requires that credit institutions must check the compliance of a new products
134 
to AML requirements before they can validate it. Finally, supervisors may receive from credit 
institutions copy of part or all AML related information those institutions disclose to FIUs or public 
prosecutors. 
Generally, supervisory authorities provide their staff with specific training on AML issues. 
Source: CEBS and information provided by national authorities. 
E) Supervision of AML compliance in connection to non-cooperative jurisdiction  
                                                                                                                                                         
AML. See CEBS (2009), §178 (references regarding CZ and FI have been updated on the basis of 
information provided by national authorities).  
133  For further information on CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS, see Annex 2. 
  Concerning the level 3 committees’ architecture, see the recent reflection undertaken by the de 
Larosière Group. In its vision for the future, this group proposes a new structure for the cooperation of 
national supervisors with increased powers at European level regarding prudential supervision. 
Interestingly, the group foresees that AML supervisory task will remain national. See de Larosière 
Group (2009), p.42 and seq., and annex V. 
134  In the case of BG, regarding products that may favour anonymity.   
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Additionally, where banks operate in jurisdictions that impede transparency, the Basel 
Committee suggests that "countries should work to adopt laws and regulations enabling bank 
supervisors to obtain and review the documentation of a bank's analysis and authorisation 
process and to take appropriate supervisory action to address deficiencies and inappropriate 
activities when necessary".
135 This line of reasoning is also integrated in the AML Directive. 
Article 31(1) second paragraph states that where the legislation of a third country does not 
permit application of measures equivalent to those laid down in the Directive with regard to 
customer due diligence and record keeping by the subsidiaries and branches of EU credit and 
financial institutions, the EU institution concerned shall be required by national law to inform 
the competent authorities of the relevant home
136 Member State accordingly
137. The Directive 
does not impose a particular task to supervisors in this regard, but rather to credit and 
financial institutions themselves which, in accordance with Article 31(3) shall be required to 
take additional measures to effectively handle the risk of money laundering or terrorist 
financing deriving from its activities in this type of third countries. The Directive is not 
explicit as to whom should require credit and financial institutions to take those additional 
measures, but this task seems to be devoted in practice to the supervisor. In any event, the 
intervention of the supervisor would be allowed by the general provision on supervision 
contained in Article 37.
138  
Recent policy developments at EU and international level are addressing the non-cooperative 
jurisdiction issue (see above part B of this Annex)
139.  
                                                 
135  Basel Committee (2006), §63. 
136  The reference to the home Member State should possibly be interpreted as referring to the State of the 
ultimate parent company of the financial group. Otherwise, this would lead to concurrent supervision of 
compliance with Article 31 if the subsidiary in a third country is itself a subsidiary located in one MS of 
a parent company located in another MS. 
137  In addition to this information duty, national legislation may be more prescriptive. For instance, a recent 
German law foresees that a parent institution domiciled in DE must also ensure that a subordinated 
enterprise, a branch or subsidiary in a non-cooperative jurisdiction does not establish or continue 
business relationships and does not undertake transactions if the obligations for the parent institution are 
impermissible or not actually practicable in a State where the subordinated enterprise is domiciled. 
Insofar as a business relationship already exists, the superordinated enterprise or parent enterprise must 
ensure (with means under company law) that such relationship is terminated by giving notice of 
termination or by other means by the subordinated enterprise, the branch or the subsidiary regardless of 
other legal or contractual provisions (cf. Section 25g of the Banking Act).  
138  According to anecdotal data collected by the Commission services, in at least 2 Member States (FR and 
PT) the supervisory authorities have been informed by banks of problems in applying CDD and record 
keeping measures in third countries. 
139  See also, regarding financial regulation and prudential supervision, the recommendation recently made 
by the de Laroisère Group on poorly regulated or uncooperative jurisdictions, de Larosière Group 
(2009), p.65 and seq.  
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ANNEX 4 – THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION FOR AML COMPLIANCE 
Banks with branches and subsidiaries outside their Member State of establishment (whether in 
the EU or outside the EU) are generally organised to manage compliance risk
140 as a group, 
that is: ensuring that the business complies with existing legislation and regulation, as well as 
with internal policies and ethical standards. This includes compliance with AML legislation 
within the EU. Indeed, a recent study conducted for the Commission indicates that trans-
national banks (and asset managers) have typically implemented the AML Directive 
provisions on a group basis
141. This is consistent with the general belief that global risk 
management is more efficient
142: through a centralized system, the flow of information allows 
the central compliance department to respond faster and more efficiently in case of suspicious 
of money laundering; the know-how of the parent company can be gradually integrated in 
their subsidiaries; and economies of scale can be achieved. 
A) The growing importance of the compliance function 
This compliance activity is increasingly integrated in the so-called 'compliance function'
143. 
The compliance function is generally seen as having an important role to play in the 
mitigation of reputational risk for the institution
144. Indeed some research found that non-
compliance with legal obligations is seen as the most significant source of reputational risk 
for businesses
145. Also, a study conducted for the Commission found that most of the banks 
and financial conglomerates participating in the survey ranked adapting to or anticipating to 
regulatory change (regardless of the source) as the most important driver of compliance 
strategy
146.  
                                                 
140  The Basel Committee defines ‘compliance risk’ as the “risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material 
financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, 
regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organisation standards, and codes of conduct applicable to 
its banking activities.” See Basel Committee (2005), §3. 
141  Europe Economics (2009), §4.62. These findings are consistent with those of a global survey 
undertaken by a consultancy firm in 2007. In this survey, 94% of internationally active banks 
responding to the survey from the European region reported that they had a global AML policy in place. 
49% of those stated that they had a full global approach (i.e. AML policies and procedures are 
developed at global level and implemented as consistently as possible worldwide) and 45% reported 
that they had a hybrid approach (i.e. there is a global AML policy but detailed procedures are set at a 
regional/local level). Only 6% would have a full AML local approach. According to this survey, 
"European banks were significantly more likely than those in other regions to apply a global approach, 
reflecting the high-level and flexible nature of much European AML legislation." See KPMG (2007), 
pp.19 and 52. 
142  Implicit in Basel Committee (2004) and Basel Committee (2005) as regards supervisory expectations. 
Also, information collected by the Commission services from major audit firms supports this opinion. 
143  The Basel Committee uses the expression ‘compliance function’ to describe staff carrying out 
compliance responsibilities, without intending to prescribe a particular organisation structure. See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (April 2005), Compliance and the compliance function in banks, 
§5.  
144  Therefore, one could also assume that some compliance activity is likely to occur in the absence of 
regulation. See Europe Economics (2009), §3.5. 
145  See Economist Intelligence Unit (2005), Reputation: risk of risks. This study surveyed 269 senior 
executives, of which 36% were drawn from financial services sector companies. See also KPMG (2007) 
which suggests that, in general, concerns about the potential reputational damage of inadequate AML 
policies and procedures has led most banks to adopt global minimum standards (p.19). 
146  Europe Economics (2009), §3.10 and seq.  
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In this context, the importance of the compliance function within banks has particularly 
grown in recent years and is becoming part of the firms’ culture. Drivers of this growth 
include increased regulatory expectations for specific operational compliance activities 
(notably including AML
147) and the switching of resources from internal audit to compliance 
– which in essence, refocuses effort towards prevention rather than treatment
148. Supervisors 
are supporting this trend. The Basel Committee has indeed promoted ten basic principles for 
the compliance function so that the bank will be able to manage its compliance risk more 
effectively, without necessarily prescribing any particular organisation structure
149. The 
respect of these principles has recently been measured by the Basel Committee
150. 
Most of the surveyed institutions in the previously mentioned study have an independent, 
specialised compliance unit within their firm: i.e. it is not an integrated function within a 
larger department such as the legal or risk management department. Compliance models do 
vary somewhat across the surveyed firms, but large firms have been able to established 
compliance functions on a decentralised basis giving a multiple lines of defence structure. The 
elements within such strategy would variously include the ingrained attitudes of staff 
(achieved through corporate culture or training), the location of compliance people within 
individual business units, the centralised compliance function (including a head for the group 
compliance to whom local compliance officers would report
151) and internal audit as a final 
line of defence. Also, the sharing of compliance functions across a number of departments is 
common to most banks – the compliance unit being responsible for addressing "classic" 
compliance roles and a risk control function that is responsible for compliance issues relating 
to, for instance, capital requirements
152. Recent developments also suggest that having a 
standalone compliance function may be a significant factor in developing a role that is more 
proactive than reactive (i.e. it is monitoring activity rather than simply proffering advice) and 
that has an increasing operational edge. 
                                                 
147  See also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (April 2005), Compliance and the compliance 
function in banks, §4: “Compliance laws, rules and standards generally cover matters such as 
observing proper standards of market conduct, managing conflicts of interest, treating customers fairly, 
and ensuring the suitability of customer advice. They typically include specific areas such as the 
prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, […].” 
148  The Basel Committee recommends that the compliance function and the audit function should be 
separate, to ensure that the activities of the compliance function are subject to independent review. For 
this, it is important that there is a clear understanding within the bank as to how risk assessment and 
testing activities are divided between the two functions and that this is documented. See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (April 2005), Compliance and the compliance function in banks, in 
particular principle 8 (relationship with internal audit). 
149  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (April 2005), Compliance and the compliance function 
in banks, §6.  
150  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), Implementation of the compliance principles – a 
survey. This survey covered 21 jurisdictions (including 10 EU Member States). 
151  The Basel Committee recommends that each bank should have an executive or senior staff member 
(referred to as ‘head of compliance’) with overall responsibility for-coordinating the identification and 
management of the bank’s compliance risk and for supervising the activities of other compliance 
function staff. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (April 2005), Compliance and the 
compliance function in banks, in particular principles 5 (independence) and 9 (cross-border issues). 
152  Europe Economics (2009), §3.37 and seq. The surveyed institutions, further to banks, financial 
conglomerates and investment banks, also include asset managers and stock exchanges.  
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According to this survey, normally the head of compliance would have access to the board 
either directly or indirectly through the firm's secretary general or the chief counsel. In a small 
minority of cases the compliance function is directly represented in the executive board
153. 
B) The internal organisation: the AML specificities 
The internal organisation in banks regarding the prevention of money laundering and the 
compliance with the AML obligations is normally described as being composed of three lines 
of defences: the compliance function responsible for the internal policies; the front 
office/operational staff and the internal/external audit function
154. 
i) The compliance function: the MLRO and the internal policies 
The compliance function normally integrates compliance with the AML obligations
155. It is 
worth highlighting in this context that, according to a study conducted for the Commission, 
money laundering responsibilities is ranked first by the surveyed banks and financial 
conglomerates in terms of resource allocation within the compliance function (see chart 
below)
156. This reflects the importance of the money laundering risk in a bank's operational 
model and also the importance attached to AML by senior management
157. Indeed, there is 
evidence that senior management in banks are more directly involved in AML activities than 
previously
158. 
                                                 
153  See also Europe Economics (2009) §3.44 and seq. for further detail on the ration of compliance staff to 
all staff (intensity) as well as on cost control and compliance. 
154  KPMG (2007), p.22-23. 
155  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), Implementation of the compliance principles – a 
survey, §31. According to this survey, the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing was 
always mentioned by respondents as being included in the compliance risk. This is confirmed by the 
study conducted by Europe Economics (2009) and the survey carried out by KPMG (2007). 
156  Europe Economics (2009), §3.14 and seq. The investment banks covered in that study also rank the 
money laundering responsibilities high regarding resources allocation within the compliance function: it 
comes second after the advising activity (see §3.28 and seq.). Interestingly, for the surveyed asset 
managers, the money laundering responsibilities have a lower(but still high) degree of importance, 
which also reflects the fact that they are not in the front line of the AML defences as banks are (see 
§3.22 and seq.). 
157  According to an independent global survey carried out by a consultancy firm in 2007, “AML remains a 
high profile issue for the senior management of banks globally”. In this survey, 70% of European banks 
reported that their most senior levels of management – including their board of directors – take an 
active interest in AML compliance, while a further 29% of the European banks stated that senior 
management took ‘some interest’ in AML issues. For this firm, “the increased profile of AML as an 
issue is part of the broader shift in the governance of world’s major banks, with boards of directors 
being held more directly accountable by shareholders and regulators for the full range of risk run by 
their banks.” See KPMG (2007), p.11. A similar survey, though limited to the UK, also outlines the 
senior management engagement in AML issues was high. See PWC (2007b), p.7. 
158  CRA International (2009), p.13 and section 3.7.3. See also FSA (2008), p.12.  





















Source: Europe Economics (2009). 
The central role for AML within banks’ organisation is with the anti-money laundering 
officer
159. In most countries, the existence of a MLRO is compulsory by law
160. The MLRO 
will normally hold a high position in the firm and integrate in the compliance function, but the 
MLRO will not necessarily be the head of compliance. He/she will typically report to the 
board, either directly or indirectly through another senior official
161. For instance, in UK 
firms, where the role of MLRO is well established, he/she will normally prepare an annual 
report addressed to the company board. In large firms, a broadly common approach is that 
he/she produces a monthly report to the compliance directors, covering, amongst other things, 
major fraud or money laundering incidents or cases
162; the status of AML related projects; and 
the status of action taken in response to recommendations raised in the previous year's MLRO 
annual report to the board
163. 
In the case of groups, MLROs will be appointed in each jurisdiction where the group is 
present, if so required – which is usual – by national legislation
164. Nevertheless, group 
                                                 
159  Generally referred to as money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) or money laundering compliance 
officer (MLCO). 
160  For instance, this is the case in at least: AT, BG, DE, EE, EL, FR, LU, MT, PL, SE, SI, SK, UK. 
161  Mutatis mutandis, see High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU – chaired by Jacques de 
Larosière (2009), p. 32 on the importance of (general) risk management, the need for independence of 
the risk management function and the need for direct access to the board of the senior risk officer (who 
should hold a very high rank in the hierarchy).  
162  In many cases, banks' departments dealing with the money laundering risk, will typically deal with the 
fraud risk as well. See KPMG (2007) p.22. Regarding UK banks, the creation of a financial crime unit 
(with potential to also encompass market abuse) appears to be a supervisory expectation. See PWC 
(2007b), pp.8 and 9and FSA (2008), p.15. On fraud issues, see generally, PWC (2007a). 
163 FSA  (2008),  p.13 
164  Even if not required, in practice banks prefer to have a local MLRO or at least a local “satellite” of the 
MLRO, who will ac as the key contact for the regulator.  
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compliance officers are typically (but not always) appointed at group level for the internal 
control and compliance management
165.  
For EU banks, the practice is that head office establishes the internal policies and procedures 
that all the subsidiaries and branches in other EU countries (and in third countries) must 
implement (without prejudice to the compliance with local rules). This is consistent with the 
supervisory expectation
166 and with national legislation implementing the AML Directive (as 
regards third countries)
167. In doing so, anecdotal evidence suggests that many larger 
institutions apply the “higher of home or host” rule to their AML policies and procedures, but 
recognising that particular local nuances in applicable laws, including data protection 
legislation, must be considered
168. Staff of the parent bank periodically  revises the 
implementation of these policies and procedures and test the effectiveness of controls. This 
may include visits to the countries concerned. 
Some views have been made
169 anticipating that a major challenge for EU banks will be to 
use the greater flexibility offered by the risk based approach in the Directive while at the same 
time leaving a sufficient audit trail for the process whereby they have made decisions about 
the key AML risks and the suitability of controls to mitigate these risks. Documenting this 
process is particularly important when rules and supervisory expectations differ from country 
to country. Another identified challenge is the effective implementation of policies and 
procedures rather than their initial design: e.g. clarity of the policies for employees, training 
and communicating the policies and procedures, and the application of these including 
monitoring effectiveness on a regular basis
170. The supervisory expectation is that the 
compliance function and the audit function (see below) take on this effectiveness evaluation 
task
171. 
ii) Front office and operations staff: automation and training 
Vigilant front office and operations staff are key to banks' AML policy regarding customer 
acceptance and on-going monitoring for the identification of suspicious activity. Their role is 
supplemented by sophisticated IT solutions (such as IT monitoring systems) which are 
increasingly used by banks (in particular large banks) for AML compliance. It is indeed 
reported that IT solutions are seen as (more or less) necessary to fulfil some compliance 
                                                 
165  In AT, for instance, it is not possible to appoint a MLRO without the permission of the supervisor. 
166  See Basel Committee (2004), §8. 
167  The Directive requirements concerning the communication of policies and procedures to branches and 
subsidiaries (cf. Article 34) apply only with regard to third countries, not within the EU. In practice, it is 
also applied within the EU.  
168  Information collected by the Commission services from major audit firms. For global firms, the US or 
UK requirements are widely used as core standards, but with more detailed policies and procedures at 
local level reflecting local law. 
169  KPMG (2007), p.54. 
170  KPMG (2007), p.20. A different survey conducted on UK financial services businesses (not limited to 
banks) reported that almost all of the firms surveyed had already documented the identified risks. It also 
underlined the need for enhancing policies and procedures in relation to automation and transaction 
monitoring, staff training, better systems/computer software and certified/electronic IDs. See PWC 
(2007b), pp. 5 and 6. 
171  See Basel Committee (2004), §9 states that: "[…] Banks' compliance and internal audit staffs, or 
external auditors, should evaluate adherence to all aspects of their group's standards for KYC, 
including the effectiveness of centralised KYC functions […]".  
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activities
172 and some firms (generally larger banks) see automation as the only way to 
provide the necessary evidence of an audit trail to the regulatory authorities in the event of 
problems arising (as well as being cost effective by comparison to manual effort). At the same 
time, the design, configuration and management of these IT solutions needs to be carefully 
considered, notably in the case of larger cross-border institutions, as the risk of false positives 
is high
173. In any event, human oversight in this area is still significant
174.  
Adequate AML training (as well as awareness) of staff is particularly necessary is the bank 
wants to be able to play an effective role in preventing money laundering. Banks continue to 
report that properly trained staff is the best AML control and this is reflected in the continued 
high spending on training programmes in this field
175. Another recent survey confirmed that 
indeed AML training (including also combating terrorist financing and the monitoring of 
financial sanctions lists) is one of the most common areas for compliance training
176. This 
survey also reports that investment in training is seen as a long-term route to savings, by 
instilling an improved corporate culture: in other words, well-trained staff is expected to 
ensure that compliance procedures are adhered to during day-to-day activities, reducing the 
requirement for intervention from the compliance department. 
Concerning training methods used, there seems to be a trend towards computer based training 
or e-learning
177. This has the advantage of being an important route to cost reduction, but it is 
also seen as a “quick fix” that requires additional classroom-based training support
178. Indeed, 
face-to-face training is largely considered to be the most effective training method
179. 
Similarly to the internal policies, the challenge is to make sure that the training delivered is 
effective and that this results in staff being sufficiently AML aware and capable
180. 
                                                 
172  Europe Economics (2009), §3.49. In another survey conducted in 2007 among UK financial services 
firms, it is reported that there could be synergies between monitoring for suspicious activities by the 
customers of the credit and financial institutions and suspicious transaction reporting required under the 
Market Abuse Directive. However, in a significant number of cases UK MLROs were not involved in 
the consideration of potentially abusive transactions as per the Market Abuse Directive. See PWC 
(2007b), p.9 and 13. 
173  In a survey conducted among UK financial services firms in 2007, the rate of false positives was 
significantly high, reaching 90% of false positives for about 80% of the respondents. See PWC (2007b), 
p.10. 
174  Ibid. §5.40. Also confirmed by KPMG (2007), p.33. 
175  According to the KPMG survey of 2007, in 38% of the surveyed European banks, more than 80% of the 
staff has received AML training in the past two years; in 30% of the banks it was between 60% and 
80% of staff, in 21% of the banks, between 41 and 60% of staff and in the rest of the banks, less than 
40% of staff. According to this survey, this reflects a risk-based approach to training, which is provided 
to those with a real need for it. See KPMG (2007), p.39 and seq. 
176  Europe Economics (2009), §3.49.  
177  Europe Economics (2009), §3.49; KP¨MG (2007), p.40. According to the FSA, in the UK most large 
firms used some sort of computer based training (CBT) to train staff in AML and other financial crime 
topics, with refresher trainings having to be undertaken annually. The standard CBT packages included 
a test which staff were required to pass and the questions of topics covered could also be tailored to suit 
the business. In addition to this, many firms provided specific training sessions for staff working in 
certain roles or business areas. See FSA (2008), p. 23. 
178  Europe Economics (2009), §3.49.  
179  See KPMG (2007), p.40-41. This survey also reports about the most commonly used training methods 
(such as face-to-face training, computer-based training, written materials, video etc). 
180  For instance, in the UK the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group Guidance states that banks should 
not only obtain acknowledgement from the individuals that they have received the necessary training, 
but should also take steps to assess its effectiveness. See JMLSG (2007), §7.38. See also KPMG (2007), 
p.42 and 53. Respondents to another survey conducted in the UK identified training, alongside  
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iii) Internal and external audit 
The third leg in the organisation is the internal or external audit function which provides for 
independent review and test controls after the event
181. A 2007 survey
182 showed that 
independent monitoring and testing of AML systems and controls is increasing
183, though not 
necessarily under the responsibility of the audit function only
184. Indeed, in recent times banks 
seemed to have switched resources from internal audit to compliance – which in essence, 
refocuses effort towards prevention rather than treatment
185.  
Different national laws foresee a particular role for the external audit on the application of the 
AML obligations by banks
186. For instance, in Belgium, Germany or Portugal the law requires 
banks’ external auditors to report on their AML systems and controls on an annual basis. In 
Belgium this report is sent to the supervisor (a similar report should also be sent to the 
supervisor in Luxembourg). In Greece, audit of internal controls (including AML procedures) 
is compulsory every 3 years. In Spain, banks must entrust the review of AML procedures to 
an external auditor with reputable experience and AML knowledge. The report established by 
this expert is sent to the national FIU/supervisor. In Ireland, it is specifically provided that the 
auditor needs to gain an understanding of how the bank ensures compliance with the AML 
legislation. Nevertheless, in many countries there are no auditing standards or standards for 
banking auditing which integrate standards in relation to the application of the AML 
obligations by banks. AML obligations are audited under ISA 250 (or similar national 
standard) which requires the consideration of laws and regulations in an audit of financial 
statements. 
                                                                                                                                                         
technology implementation, as the most important challenges faced by the financial institutions in 
meeting AML regulations in the future. The survey concludes that "forward-thinking organisations will 
take steps to embed the AML regime requirements into key staff consciousness. These efforts will often 
go beyond a one-off training session. The key to successfully raising staff awareness is to provide 
support and information on a continual basis." The survey also underlines that the culture of an 
organisation is one of the key components to an effective AML regime. See PWC (2007b), p.11. 
181  The Basel Committee recommends that the compliance function and the audit function should be 
separate, to ensure that the activities of the compliance function are subject to independent review. For 
this, it is important that there is a clear understanding within the bank as to how risk assessment and 
testing activities are divided between the two functions and that this is documented. See Basel 
Committee (2005), in particular principle 8 (relationship with internal audit). See also Basel Committee 
(2004), §9 on risk management where it is stated that "[…]. Internationally active banking groups need 
both an internal audit and a global compliance functions since these are the principle and in some 
circumstances the only mechanisms for monitoring the application of the bank's global KYC standards 
and supporting policies and procedures, […]". 
182  KPMG (2007), p.21 and seq. 
183  According to the KPMG survey, the vast majority (70%) of the surveyed European banks report that 
they have a monitoring and testing program in place. However, this survey notes that the European 
figures (70% of the banks) might need to be adjusted upwards, since the significant low figures 
provided by German and Swiss banks do not seem to include external auditing reviews but only internal 
monitoring. Ibid., pp.21-22 and 52. 
184  The KPMG survey reports that a wide range of functions within banks’ organisation are involved in this 
monitoring and testing, though these functions have different roles and responsibilities in relation to 
AML. The prevalent role in this regard is with internal audit, compliance function and external audit. 
Other functions with a role in testing and monitoring the effectiveness of AML systems and controls 
are: operations, financial crime/fraud prevention units or external consultants. KPMG underlines the 
increase, compared to 2004, in the amount of AML monitoring carried out by financial crime or fraud 
prevention units. See KPMG (2007), p.22. 
185  Europe Economics (2009), §3.38.  
186  It should not be forgotten that auditors are themselves subject to the AML obligations of the Directive.  
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Concerning the audit of a group, there do not seem to exist specific rules on the split between 
the auditor at group level and the auditor(s) at subsidiary level. In practice, the group auditor 
will often wish to instruct the subsidiary auditor in order to obtain a degree of assurance on 
the AML provisions at subsidiary level. Particular difficulties have already arisen, as shown 
by anecdotal evidence, regarding access by the head office auditor to subsidiaries’ data on 
reported suspicious transactions to the FIUs. Auditors are considered to be third parties under 
Article 28 of the AML Directive and therefore are prevented from accessing to such 
information. Similar difficulties may arise as a result of bank secrecy rules. 
When auditors find weaknesses related to the management of the AML risk, they generally 
report such findings to the Audit Committee or the Board of Directors or both. Management is 
sometimes also informed and in some instances the auditors at group level are alerted as well.  
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ANNEX 5 – CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE AND REPORTING AT GROUP LEVEL 
A) The treatment of the client 
Common internal polices on customer due diligence exist within banking groups
187. 
Nevertheless, the central application of identification/verification measures to clients and/or 
customer activity monitoring is not the practice – although banking associations tend to 
consider that such a possibility would be advantageous
188.  
i) The risk based approach to customer due diligence 
The existence of those policies does not result either in a uniform application of the internal 
rules across the group. The AML Directive allows banks to determine the extent of the 
customer due diligence measures on a risk sensitive basis and, as confirmed by the data 
obtained by the Commission services, banks are indeed doing so
189. Different factors are 
taken into account by banks in implementing the risk based approach, including geographical 
considerations
190. This implies that, even if policies and procedures within the group are 
generally shared, the practical application of the customer due diligence measures will be 
adapted to local conditions and no box ticking approach followed. Hence, the client of one 
entity within the group is not automatically accepted as client of all entities of the group. 
ii) Customer acceptance policy 
Indeed, it appears from the information collected by the Commission services that the parent 
bank will, in general, not automatically accept customers which have already been accepted 
by their subsidiaries/branches in other Member States. Branches and subsidiaries abroad will 
have their own KYC procedures in their jurisdictions and each customer its individual dossier. 
If necessary, institutions within a group can cooperate to create the dossier but the final result 
will not be automatically shared and is not used to waive the requirements in another 
jurisdiction (concerning the flows of information within the group, see part D of this Annex).  
                                                 
187  Indeed, the AML Directive requires banks to communicate relevant policies and procedures of customer 
due diligence to branches and (majority owned) subsidiaries. This is explicitly requested with regard to 
branches and subsidiaries in third countries (cf. Article 34) and implicitly with regard to branches and 
subsidiaries within the EU. This is also a supervisory expectation, see Basel (2004), §10 and seq. See 
also §7 of this paper.  
188  Interestingly, the Basel Committee also advanced in 2004 that complementing monitoring of accounts 
and transactions at local level with aggregated monitoring at the centralised site would provide banks 
with the opportunity to monitor for patterns of suspicious activity that cannot be observed from the 
local side. See Basel (2004), §16.  
189  See for instance regarding account opening KPMG (2007), p.24 and seq. This survey also notes that 
roughly three quarters of the European banks have remediation programs in place to ‘backfill’ customer 
data regarding customers whose relationship with the bank pre-dates the introduction of current KYC 
and account-opening legislation. Ibid., p.26-27 and p.52. 
190  The FATF has recently provided general guidance to the banking industry in this regard. See FATF 
(2007). In the KPMG survey, the following 5 factors are highlighted by respondent banks at the 
account-opening phase: the country in which the customer lives or operates; the nature of the 
customer’s business; the type of account or banking product; the anticipated volume and/or value of 
customer transactions; whether the customer is politically exposed. See KPMG (2007), p.25. See also 
Basel (2004), §12.  
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Hence, the parent bank will apply customer due diligence measures, where applicable, not 
least in order to comply with national requirements which may differ as to the level or detail 
of customer due diligence measures to be conducted
191 or as to the approaches to information 
data collection and retention
192. For instance, concerning the identification of customers and 
the verification of customers' identities, there are some national constraints to be respected 
when in cross-border situations. Table A5.1 gives an overview of the types of identification 
requirements foreseen by national legislation in face-to-face situations
193. 
If a customer is transferred within the group, different situations apply to branches and 
subsidiaries located in the EU. In the case of a branch's customer, a bank may in principle rely 
in the on already existing identification data held by the branch provided it is up-to-date and 
fulfils the requirements set out in the destination Member State legislation. This is so because 
the branch is the same legal person as the bank, therefore rights and obligations are caused by 
the bank itself. In the case of subsidiaries in the EU
194, normal rules on relations with third 
parties will be applied. In several Member States, legislation allows (or does not forbid) banks 
to use agents or third parties (outsourcing) for the identification/verification of customers
195, 
so a subsidiary could benefit from these provisions. The Directive rules on reliance are also 
applied in most Member States
196. These rules allow the bank to rely on the 
identification/verification of customers already conducted by a third party (in this case the 
subsidiary
197). In some cases, legislation has made explicit that the third party should have 
identified the customer face-to-face, so as to avoid distance identifications or chains of third 
parties
198, of the fact that third parties should always carry out new diligence measures on the 
customer concerned without relying on measures previously carried out with those 
customers
199. No specific provisions foreseeing a special treatment for customers introduced 
subsidiaries have been enacted by national legislation – though the application of the risk 
based approach and the information flows within the group could facilitate the customer 
acceptance process.  
iii) Customer acceptance policy: special cases 
                                                 
191  For instance, it is possible that the level/detail of CDD requirements is higher in Member State A (e.g. 
the country where the customer will be transferred) compared to Member State B (the country of the 
first identification: e.g. enhanced CDD in Member State A but not in B; or simplified CDD in Member 
State B but not in A. On this issue, see Part B of this Annex containing information on the different 
requirements applied by Member States.  
192  This is also recognised by Basel (2004), §13. 
193  It should be noted that some items may not be directly required by law, but will be part of the normal 
know-your-customer process undertaken by banks on a risk sensitive basis 
194  If the subsidiary is located in a third country, it would also benefit from the reliance rules provided that 
the AML regime in that third country is considered equivalent to that of the Community (cf. Article 
16(1)(b) of the AML Directive). 
195  This is at least the case in AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, LT, LU, NL, RO, SE, SI, 
SK and UK. However, it is not possible in BG and MT (outsourcing).  
196  They are at least applied in AT, BE; BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES (draft law), FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, 
LU, LV, MT, NL, PL (draft law), PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK. They are not applied in LT.  
197  In some countries (for instance, BG, CZ, EE or SI), the possibility to rely on a third party is limited to 
certain types of third party, such as banks or financial institutions only. In any event, these categories 
would normally encompass the subsidiary.  
198  For instance, in AT, BE, EE, EL, IT, LT, LV and SI. Concerning BG, CY, CZ, DE, FI, FR, HU, LU, 
NL, SK and UK it is allowed to rely on a third party introducer who identified the customer in a non-
face to face situation provided, in the case of BG, CZ, FR HU and NL, that enhanced CDD is applied. 
For DE, the situation has to be taken into account when assessing the risk situation of the customer 
relationship. In ES, IE and PT additional legislation should clarify the situation.  
199  For instance, in AT and DE.  
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Politically exposed persons (PEPs) and sanctions lists are two areas where banks are making 
an effort to apply a group policy. Banks increasingly establish specific procedures to identify 
and monitor PEPs on an on going basis, with a view to apply enhanced customer due 
diligence measures – as mandated by the Directive.
200 Anecdotal views collected by the 
Commission services suggest that a centralised approach to PEP compliance is desirable for 
large organisations with cross-border presence, though local requirements must also be 
followed. One of the main difficulties identified by the banking sector in this regard is the 
identification of the PEPs themselves, also considering that there is no single definition of 
PEP at global level (though at EU level, there is a rather harmonised definition). In order to 
mitigate their risk – and also because of fear of being sanctioned in case of failure, banks tend 
to rely on commercial lists which they purchase.
201  
It appears that, as a general rule, lists of terrorists, although they can be provided by the parent 
bank, are applied by each bank according to local rules. However, many banks would 
voluntarily apply, to the extent permitted by personal data protection legislation, the sanction 
lists of the countries where they operate in order to mitigate risks
202. Indeed, a centralised 
approach to compliance with sanction lists would be recommended by advisory firms to larger 
banking organisations with a cross-border presence, as this helps ensuring a consistent 
approach within the group. Difficulties, as underlined by banking associations to the 
Commission services, are not to be excluded. For instance, electronic lists are considered as 
non valid against third parties (only paper list published on the official journal of the 
European Union are legally binding); the multiplicity of lists renders its updating uneasy and 
at risk; and the quality of the data does not always allow for the identification of the required 
person which impairs the effectiveness of the control. The resulting legal risks faced by banks 
are not insignificant.  
iv) Monitoring clients' activities and transactions. 
Banking associations report that monitoring at level group is only used for subsidiaries and 
branches within the same jurisdiction. In cross-border situations, the monitoring of customer 
activity is conducted directly by the institutions at local level, allegedly due to local regulatory 
requirements
203. Even if policies and procedures are applied locally, they are normally 
                                                 
200  According to an independent survey conducted in 2007, two thirds of the surveyed European banks 
have this kind of procedures in place, though figures were expected to increase following the national 
transpositions of the AML Directive. It is noted that there were significant variations depending on the 
country. This survey also shows that at the account-opening phase, 75% of the surveyed European 
banks considered the existence of PEPs as a risk factor triggering the performance of enhanced 
customer due diligence. See KPMG (2007), p.29 and seq, and p.53. In another survey, limited to the 
UK, about a third of the participants indicated that one of the biggest challenges faced by their 
organizations in the future was the requirements linked to PEPs. See PWC (2007b), p.11. 
201  According to the KPMG survey of 2007, 61% of the surveyed European banks used commercial lists 
and a further 29% use a combination of commercial lists with in-house additions. Only 10% of these 
banks would create their own internal lists. 
202  Banks are under significant regulatory and supervisory pressure in this area. The question of the 
application of the US OFAC lists is regularly raised by banks. See for instance, KPMG(2007), p.54. 
203  This appears to be also confirmed by the 2007 KPMG survey, which shows that a significant proportion 
of banks could not carry out customer monitoring, allegedly because of privacy laws in some countries 
prevent the sharing of information around the group. See KPMG (2007), p.37. See also in this regard 
footnote 271.  
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validated by the parent bank, which is in line with supervisory expectations
204. Indeed, most 
banks have developed systems and controls to monitor transactions and detect unusual or 
suspicious items.  
Different methods are used by banks for customer monitoring, such as vigilant staff, sample 
review of transactions by compliance department; investigation of 'exception by value' reports 
or the increased used of sophisticated IT monitoring systems
205. There are advantages in 
operating this kind of IT systems such as the potential to screen high volumes of transactions 
and spot patterns of behaviour that may be spread over time or spread over multiple 
transactions
206. At the same time, these IT systems appear to be relatively costly (see Annex 6 
on cost of compliance) and the human resources implications must not be underestimated (for 
instance the analysis of potentially suspicious transactions, the need to review false positives 
etc). Also, it is reported that it is not always easy to calibrate the escalation thresholds in the 
systems, which contain complex mathematical algorithms.
207 The challenge for banks is to 
adopt these systems to the right money laundering trends and typologies, for which 
intelligence sharing with the public sector is key. Customer monitoring with a view to identify 
terrorist financing patterns is reported to be difficult, notably because of the frequently small 
value of the associated transactions. In this case, the view has been expressed that enhanced 
transaction monitoring alone was unlikely to prove a solution to these difficulties, which 
could trigger the need for increased intelligence sharing between the public and the private 
sector
208.  
                                                 
204  The Basel Committee considers that an "essential element for addressing higher risks is the coordinated 
approach to the monitoring of customer account activity on a groupwide basis." But it also recognises 
that such monitoring will be done locally. See Basel Committee (2004), §14 and seq.  
205  See KPMG (2007), p.33 and seq. It is reported that around two thirds of the surveyed European banks 
have recourse to more sophisticated IT monitoring systems. The importance of vigilant staff is, 
however, also underlined in that survey. This is also confirmed by FSA (2008), p.21 and seq. 
206  At the same time, there could be additional benefits arising from these systems, such as improved 
marketing opportunities and customer relationship management, improved reputational risk 
management and fraud reduction. 
207  KPMG (2007), p.38. 
208  KPMG (2007), p.53.  
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Table A5.1 – Customer identification requirements in national law, regulation or guidance 
Requirement  AT BE BG CY CZ DE EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL
*** 
PL PT RO SE SI SK UK 
First  and  last  name  collected  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x  x 
Residential address collected  x*  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x    x    x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Date  of  birth  collected  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x x  x  x 
Place of birth collected  x*  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x    x      x    x            x    x  x 
Gender  collected       x    x    x  x    x  x     x        x  x**    x 
Customer signature recorded   x*  x  x        x  x  x  x  x  x  x    x  x          x  x      x 
Information on purpose and 
intended nature of business 
relationship collected 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   x x x  x  x 
Information on customer's 
profession collected  
x* x  x  x  x**   x  x  x x x    x      x    x      x      x x 
Information on customer's public 
function collected 
x  x*  x x x      x  x    x  x  x  x  x**   x  x  x  x 
Customer's nationality collected  x*   x  x  x  x    x  x  x  x   x      x  x  x x    x 
National ID number collected  x*    x  x  x    x  x  x  x    x    x  x    x    x    x  x      x 
National tax number collected  x*    x          x                        x        x   
Copy of ID card recorded 
(passport for no nationals) 
  x x x x    x x x x x x x x x x x x     x x x 
*** 
 x 
Copy of facial picture recorded    x  x  x  x    x x x x x x x x x x x x     x x     x 
Reference to the documents used 
for verifying the identity 
          x          x       x   
Customer risk profile should be 
created (on a risk sensitive basis) 
x x x x x x x x x x x    x x x x x x x   x x x  x  x 
** 
* on a risk sensitive basis 
** CZ: only if applicable (e.g. if the account is for business purposes); NL (with regard to PEPs); SE (the social security number is collected, for those customers who have a Swedish social security 
number, as part of customer identification. It automatically contains info on gender). 
*** NL (legislation does not specify what data must be collected, but requires that institutions must identify the customer and verify his/her identity on the basis of documents, data or information 
obtained from a reliable and independent source. However, it is required that the information as mentioned in this table are kept for 5 years); UK (legislation does not specify what data must be 
collected, but requires that institutions must identify the customer and verify his/her identity on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source. The Joint 
Money Laundering Steering Group guidance describes the types of information that may be gathered in different circumstances. Institutions should keep copies of, or reference to, the evidence of the 
customer's identity for five years. Copies may be stored electronically); SE (only collected for customers without Swedish social security number). 
Source: Anti-Money Laundering Task Force of CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR and information provided by Member States. 
It should be noted that some items may not be directly required by law, but will be part of the normal know-your-customer process undertaken by financial institutions on a risk sensitive basis. Also, 
some identification items may be contained in official documents collected and this explain why they are not required.  
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B) Simplified and enhanced customer due diligence 
Part B of Annex 5 provides a short description of the national requirements on simplified and 
enhanced customer due diligence pursuant to the AML Directive. As explained above, 
banking groups will need to take those national requirements into account when applying a 
group policy.  
Concerning simplified CDD measures, table A5.2 (below) presents a summary of Member 
States' transposition of Article 11 of the AML Directive as well as Article 3 of Directive 
2006/70/EC (Commission's implementing measures). 
Concerning enhanced CDD measures, the AML Directive requires their application in at least 
in the following situations: non-face to face customers (Article 13(2)); cross-frontier 
correspondent banking relationships with respondent banks from third countries (Article 
13(3)) and transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons (Article 
13(4)). In addition, Article 13(1) requires banks "to apply, on a risk-sensitive basis, enhanced 
customer due diligence measures […] in situations which by their nature can present a higher 
risk of money laundering". These requirements are integrated in national legislation. 
In addition, some Member States have integrated in their national legislation additional 
requirements on enhanced CDD measures: 
–  BG, with regard to: (i) non-resident customers in BG, as well as off-shore companies, the 
companies of nominal owners of bearer shares, trust companies and similar structures; (ii) 
customers, operations and transactions that are linked to states which do not apply or do 
not completely apply international AML standards. 
–  CY, with regard to: (i) accounts in the name of companies whose shares are in the form of 
bearer; (ii) clients accounts in the name of third persons; (iii) private banking customers; 
(iv) customers providing services of electronic gambling/gaming through the Internet; (v) 
accounts in the name of trusts; (vi) customers from countries which do not adequately 
apply FATF's recommendations. 
–  EL, with regard to: (i) non-residents’ accounts, (ii) politically exposed persons, (iii) 
accounts of companies with bearer shares, (iv) accounts of offshore etc. companies, (v) 
trusts, (vi) accounts of non-profit organisations, (vii) portfolio management accounts of 
important clients, (viii) non-face to face business relationships/transactions, (ix) cross-
border correspondent banking relationships with respondent banks from third countries, (x) 
countries which do not comply adequately with the FATF recommendations. 
–  ES, with regard to: (i) private banking, (ii) distance banking, (iii) currency exchange, and 
(iv) cross-border transfer of funds. 
–  FI, with regard to customers or transactions connected with a State whose system of 
preventing money laundering and terrorist financing does not meet the international 
obligations. 
–  FR, with regard to: (i) products or transactions that may favour anonymity; (ii) operations 
with or clients located in non-cooperative jurisdictions; (iii) cheque cashing or discounting 
service with foreign institutions; (iv) money transmission services; (v) opening of savings 
accounts; (vi) paying of life insurance.   
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–  HU, with regard to currency exchange above a predetermined threshold. 
–  LV, with regard to some high risk situations identified in national regulations. These high 
risk situations depend on: country risk (e.g. list of non-cooperative countries of the FATF), 
customer risk (e.g. legal persons issuing bearer shares), risk associated with the economic 
activity of the customer (e.g. traders in arms and ammunition) or risk associated with the 
products or services used by the customer (e.g. private banking)
209. 
–  RO, with regard to: (i) jurisdictions that do not adequately apply AML/CFT requirements; 
(ii) credit institutions which offer personalized banking services (private banking); (iii) 
accounts which are not nominated (the identity of the client is known only by the credit 
institution and it is replaced by a sequential number). 
In other Member States (AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, IE, IT, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, SE, SI, 
SK, UK) there are no additional requirements in their national legislation concerning 
enhanced CDD. 
                                                 
209  For more detail, see Regulation No 125 of 27 August 2008, available at the website of the Financial and 
Capital Market Commission of Latvia: www.fktk.lv/en/law/general/fcmc_regulations   
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Table A5.2 – Simplified CDD requirements 
Requirement 
 
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK 
Art. 11(1): the customer is a 
credit or financial institution 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
** 
x x x x x x x x x x x x  x  x x 
Art. 11(2)(a): listed companies 
 
x x    x x x x x x  **  x   x  **  x x x x x x x x x  x  x x 
Art. 11(2)(b): beneficial owners 
of pooled accounts held by 
legal profess. 
x*  x x x x x x x     x    **  x x x x x   x x  x  x  x x 
Art. 11(2)(c): domestic public 
authorities 
x x x x x x x x x  **  x   x  **  x x x x x x x x x x  x  x x 
Art. 11(5)(a): life insurance 
 
x x x x x x x x x x x   x  **  x x x x x x x x x x  x  x x 
Art. 11(5)(b): pension schemes 
 
x x    x x x x x x x x   x  **  x x x x x x x x x x  x  x x 
Art. 11(5)(c): employee 
schemes 
 
  x    x x s x x x  **  x   x  **  x   x x x x   x  x  x  x x 
Art. 11(5)(d): e-money 
 
x x    x x x x   x  **  x    **  x x x x x x x x x  x  x  x x 
Directive 2006/70/EC, Art. 
3(1): EC/EU institutions 
x    x x x x x x x        x  **  x x x x x x   x x  x  x  x x 
Directive 2006/70/EC, Art. 
3(2):  
Other financial institutions 
                  x  x       x  x   
Directive 2006/70/EC, Art. 
3(3): low risk products 
     x  x*    x*        **      x  x  x*     x*  x      x* 
* AT (special fiduciary accounts of authorised real estate administrators acting on behalf of joint ownership associations for real state properties); DE (state subsidized, fully funded private pension; 
capital-forming investment, where the contract meets the conditions for state subsidies; a loan contract, financial leasing contract or instalment sale transaction with a consumer; a loan contract as part of 
a state subsidy programme carried out by a federal or state development bank, where the loan amount must be used for a designated purpose; credit contract for instalment financing; any other loan 
contract where the loan account serves the exclusive purpose of repaying the loan and the loan payments are withdrawn from the creditor’s account with a credit institution; a savings agreement; a 
leasing agreement; etc.), EE (transactions with units of an investment fund, with to units of a mandatory pension fund, and with bank accounts held by the pension or social benefit fo natural persons, 
under certain conditions), UK (children trust fund, other low risk products meeting specified conditions) 
** ES (planned in draft law), FR (legislation to be developed with regard to the other situations), IE (planned in draft law) 
Source: information provided by national authorities  
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C) The treatment of the money laundering suspicion 
While the policies for risk assessment and detection of suspicious transactions are generally 
defined at group level (see above), those policies are applied directly at local level. As a 
result, the analysis of detected transactions that give rise to suspicions and, where applicable, 
the filing of reports with the FIUs appears to be largely dealt with at local level. Indeed, 
national legislation does not contain, in general, particular provisions requiring that such 
analysis is conducted at group level
210. It appears, however, that it is not necessarily prevented 
either and it would depend on the possibility to exchange information between parent and 
subsidiaries/branches on suspicions
211 (see Part D of this Annex).  
The filing of "suspicious transaction reports/suspicious activity reports" with the FIUs, 
follows local laws and procedures. National legislation in EU countries does not require the 
parent bank to report to the FIU (or to the supervisor) of its own Member State about reports 
filed by their branches or subsidiaries in other Member States
212. This is normally not done on 
a voluntary basis either, unless in exceptional cases when there is a serious reputational risk 
for the group.  
D) Cross border information flows within the banking group 
Supervisors attach particular importance to the question of cross-border intra-group sharing of 
information, in particular on higher risk customers and activities relevant to the global 
management of reputational and legal risks
213. This question is possibly the most difficult one 
for banks when implementing an AML compliance policy at group level. The main reason for 
this is the balance between the AML requirements, on the one side, and the personal data 
protection legislation and/or banking secrecy regulations, on the other side. Different 
scenarios may be envisaged on intra-group information flows, depending if they concern: (i) 
customers; (ii) suspicions; (iii) reports filed with the FIUs (and related issues); or (iv) 
feedback from FIUs. Additionally (v) these flows may be linked to the question of record 
keeping. 
(i) Information flows on customers (not linked to a suspicion) 
                                                 
210  In BG, reporting entities are obliged by the law to apply a group policy with regard to the management 
of the money laundering suspicion.  
211  In some countries, some legislative provisions seem to be indirectly related to this issue. For instance, 
according to the IT law, financial intermediaries belonging to the same group may use a single service 
centre to keep and manage their own archives to that a delegate may extract integrated records at group 
level, including for the purposes of reporting suspicious transactions to the FIU. In SE there is no 
explicit requirement in the new law of a group policy as such, but the FSA’s secondary regulation 
(which is directly enforceable) FFFS 2009:1 requires that a central function within a group is designated 
with the responsibility to make sure that the legally stipulated reporting requirements (which mirror 
those of the 3
rd AML directive) are met by a group. In addition to this the secondary regulation also 
contains specific provisions on internal control mechanisms within a group in order to make sure that 
the requirements in the new law are actually met. 
212  A paradoxical case may arise when the bank has no branch or subsidiary in a State where it provides 
financial services. In such a situation, it would report to the FIU of its own Member State about 
suspicious transactions.  
213  See Basel Committee (2004), §§17-19. In particular the Basel Committee recommends that the “bank’s 
centralised KYC function should evaluate the potential risk posed by activity reported by its branches 
and subsidiaries and where appropriate assess its world-wide exposure to a given customer.” Ibid. §18.  
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In almost all of Member States
214, the national AML legislation does not explicitly restrict the 
circulation of information regarding customers within the banking group for the purposes of 
applying customer due diligence measures. Additionally, in one Member State
215 there is a 
possibility to use a single service centre to keep and manage customers archives consolidated 
at group level which may be used by the AML officers of the different entities of the group. 
In practice, the perception of the banking associations is that, in the majority of cases, flow of 
information within the group with regard to customers would not take place due to the 
restrictive effects resulting from national legislation on data protection (or the application 
thereof) and general rules on banking secrecy (where they exist). Anecdotal evidence suggest 
that banking groups tend to overcome these difficulties through on-site visits by head 
office/parent bank staff, who then are able to report back to headquarters. 
This situation does not seem to match the supervisory recommendations. The Basel 
Committee warns about legal impediments to the transfer of customer information to head 
offices, which may conflict with the consolidated KYC objective
216. It should be note in this 
regard, however, that it is unclear whether the Basel Committee has taken into account the 
fundamental right dimension of the legislation on the protection of personal data. 
(ii) Information flows on suspicions, prior to the formalisation of a report 
An adequate treatment of suspicions within a banking group, aiming at determining whether 
the filing of a suspicious transaction report is necessary, may require an information exchange 
with other entities within the group on the suspicious case (as well as on previous suspicious 
transaction reports established on the same customer within the group. In several Member 
States there are no restrictions in the national AML legislation concerning the transmission of 
information within the banking group on suspicious transactions prior to the formalisation of a 
report to the FIU (or the decision not to make one), and at least in one of them
217 it is required 
by law to provide the other entities of the group with information necessary to combat money 
laundering (or terrorist financing). For some of these Member States, Article 28(1) would not 
prevent such transmission as it would only prohibit disclosure of the fact that a report was 
filed (or will be) with the FIU
218. For others, irrespective of the interpretation of Article 28(1), 
Article 28(3) of the Directive would be interpreted as allowing for such transmission of 
                                                 
214  AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PT, RO, SE, SI, 
SK and UK.  
215 IT 
216  The Basel Committee considers “essential that all jurisdictions that host foreign banks provide an 
appropriate legal framework which allows information for KYC risk management purposes to be 
passed to the head office/parent bank.” The Basel Committee also believes that “there is no justifiable 
reason why local legislation should impede the passage of customer information from a bank branch or 
subsidiary to its head office or parent bank for risk management purposes”. It further states that “if the 
law restricts disclosure of information to “third parties” it is essential that the head office or parent 
bank is clearly excluded from the definition of a third party.” Finally, the Basel Committee urges 
jurisdictions that have legislation that impedes, or can be interpreted as impeding, such information 
sharing, to remove any such restrictions and to provide specific gateways. See Basel Committee (2004), 
§§24-27, in particular §27. 
217 FR. 
218  BE, SI. For other Member States, such as DE, the prohibition in Article 28(1) would capture data 
related to the preparation of a report to the FIU. Also, the question of the interpretation of "third person" 
in Article 28 would appear with regard to branches. To the extent that the branch and the parent 
institution are the same institution, one could interpret Article 28(1) as not prohibiting the cross-border 
flow of information within the same institution.   
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information (i.e. the formation of the suspicion being an operation which serves the purpose 
of compliance with the obligation to file a "suspicious transaction report")
219. 
Some countries have provided for explicit safeguards in this regard, such as: the information 
disclosed in this manner should only be exchanged between the AML compliance 
departments responsible for making the reports, to the exclusion of other staff members
220; or 
such disclosures should not undermine an investigation by the authorities
221. 
Nevertheless, in other Member States, it is not possible
222 to share information within the 
group on suspicious transactions prior to the formalisation of a report with the FIU (only after 
the report is filed with the FIU such transmission would be possible), or it is not foreseen
223. 
In one Member State
224, an intermediate situation is foreseen. On the one hand, the legislation 
only provides for the transmission of information within the group if a report has been made. 
On the other hand, it is possible to use the single service centre on customer information 
referred to above (Part D (i) of this Annex) also for the purposes of reporting suspicious 
transactions. 
In practice, according to the banking associations, information on suspicious cases is rarely 
shared within the group. This would happen only in exceptional cases, covered by 
agreements/protocols under the control of the parent bank that guarantee confidentiality and 
secure transmission of data. The banking associations' perception in this regard is that national 
data protection laws and bank secrecy rules would generally prevent the circulation of this 
kind of data between institutions of the same group (see above Section 6.3).  
(iii) Information flows on reports filed with the FIUs  
The possibility of circulating, within the banking group, information on reports filed with the 
FIUs is provided for in Article 28(3) of the AML Directive. Almost all Member States have 
integrated this provision in national law. One Member State
225, however, decided not to allow 
for the intra-group disclosures relating to reports filed with the FIU. Similar safeguards
226 as 
above would also apply here.  
It should be noted in this regard that FIUs within the EU are not particularly supportive of the 
intra-group sharing of information on reports filed with them. While recognising that the 
derogation in Article 28(3) of the AML Directive satisfies "the need to reinforce the fight 
against money laundering and facilitate within groups the integration of the risk-based 
approach logic", this sharing of information raises, from the FIUs' point of view, a number of 
matters of principle "as regards professional secrecy and confidentiality,  the principle of 
territoriality, the cooperation between FIUs, data protection, [and] the secure feedback of 
                                                 
219  AT, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, FR, HU, MT. Such transmission of information is also accepted in BG, 




222  PL, SK. In NL, the law requires that the report with the FIU is done immediately. Therefore, de facto it 
is not possible to share information within the group before formalising the report. 
223 PT. 
224 IT. 
225  SI, with regard to disclosures between parent bank and subsidiary. However, information flows between 
branch and head office are possible. 
226  Cf. Part D (ii) of this Annex, regarding the staff able to access the exchange of information.   
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information to disclosing professions".
227 They also underline that there is a risk of abusing 
the permission for this kind of intra-group exchanges of information and circumvent other 
prohibitions of disclosure.
228  
(iv) Information flows on feedback from FIUs 
In principle, no restrictions exist for the circulation of information within the banking group 
about trends, typologies or general feedback received from FIUs or other public authorities, 
provided it does not include precise information on clients or their transactions related to on-
going procedures. Concerning feedback on on-going particular cases including data on clients 
and transactions – when provided,
229 legislation in a few countries allows for the intra-group 
circulation of such feedback
230. Nevertheless, national legislation is in most cases silent
231 and 
thus open to interpretation. In some countries, legislation could be interpreted that the 
circulation of specific feedback within the group is permissible (i.e. in the absence of 
prohibition) for AML purposes
232. The practice is also that such circulation would be possible 
with the express authorisation of the FIU
233 – otherwise, the information should remain the 
AML compliance department of the reporting entity
234; or FIUs would discourage 
dissemination by clearly marking such feedback as confidential
235. In any event, general rules 
on data protection and bank secrecy would apply: for instance in two countries
236, the "need-
to-know" principle would apply to such information flows. Finally, in one Member State
237, 
legislation explicitly foresees that FIU feedback with regard to specific reports cannot be 
disclosed within the institutions belonging to the same group, only the report itself can be.  
(v) The question of record keeping 
According to the banking associations, due to regulatory requirements, information is 
archived in each local jurisdiction, without connection between databases. For instance, in one 
                                                 
227  See EU FIU Platform (2008), p.14-15. FIUs particularly underline the risk that information is circulated 
in an unsafe manner. They also warn about the possible creation of parallel channels of information 
exchange outside the framework of official secured mutual cooperation between FIUs given that an FIU 
might obtain information from the national branch or subsidiary of a group that has obtained such 
information within the framework of intra-group exchanges. They also indicate that there is a risk of 
duplicating the FIU's work in this regard. The principle of territoriality related to the transmission of 
suspicious transaction reports could accordingly encounter difficulties with respect to its application 
due to possible centralisation of reports of suspicious transactions within the parent companies of 
groups.  
228  For instance, in order to circumvent the prohibition to provide information following a request by the 
judicial authorities, banks could disclose the same information to the FIU and then pretend to be entitled 
to circulate the information within the group. See EU FIU Platform (2008), p.16. 
229  This type of specific feedback is not always provided by FIUs. In some cases, feedback is limited to 
either general feedback or to publicly available information (e.g. outcome of the judicial procedures). 
On feedback, see generally B & S Europe (2009).  
230  DK, HU, LU, LV, SK. At least in one case, Article 28(3) of the AML Directive has been interpreted as 
allowing intra-group circulation of information regarding specific feedback on previously filed 
suspicious transaction reports.  
231  AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, MT, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI. 
232  AT, DE, EE, IE, IT, LT, PT, RO, SE, SI 
233  FIUs are, in general, not too favourable to the disclosure of feedback within the banking group. See EU 
FIU Platform (2008), p.13-14. 
234  BG, CY, FI, RO, UK. 
235 IE,  MT. 
236 DK,  MT. 
237 NL.  
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Member State the data retention period is longer than the one foreseen in the Directive
238. As 
a result, centralised archiving at group level of the information collected by different Member 
States is not really feasible, although it could be an efficient way of ensuring that records are 
easily retrievable and logged. This also implies that it is not possible for an institution to 
organise a centralised system covering operations in different Member States in order to 
comply with the requirements of Article 32 of the Directive.
239  
                                                 
238  In ES and SI, the data retention period is 6 years.  
239  There are efficiency arguments in favour of such a centralised system: for instance, a centralised system 
would ensure a consistent approach and the smooth the transfer of knowledge around requests for 
information from local FIUs. At the same time, the key factor is that the information can be retrieved 
quickly, rather than the actual location of the records.   
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ANNEX 6 – THE COST OF COMPLIANCE 
The cost of compliance with AML requirements is not insignificant and has increased in 
recent years following the regulatory changes introduced in the EU, notably the AML 
Directive
240.  
A recent external study has examined for the Commission the cost impact of compliance for 
certain types of firms within the financial industry (including banks) with six key EU 
directives in the financial services area, including the AML Directive
241. The study focuses on 
the so-called ‘incremental compliance costs’ caused by regulation, not on the total costs of 
activities that happens to contribute to regulatory compliance
242.  
The study identifies separately cost impacts that are of one-off nature (i.e. those costs that 
only have to be incurred once in making the transition, such as IT investment and the re-
shaping of business processes) from those that are recurring in nature (on-going costs as a 
result of regulation). The ongoing costs of compliance for any given firm are typically lower 
than the one-off costs. Looking at the different sectors surveyed, recurring costs are mostly 
between 15 and 20 per cent of the implementation cost recorded (with some exceptions)
243. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates this divergence in scale, by showing the dispersion of the results 
obtained for the AML Directive. 
This study shows that firms have adopted different strategies in approaching the 
implementation of the Directive both regarding one-off (in particular, in their willingness to 
put maximum reliance upon the automation of processes) and ongoing costs. The dispersion 
in the ongoing costs — and general business experience — suggest that firms have 
experienced differing levels of success in achieving this objective. Indeed the study shows a 
wide dispersion of results. 
                                                 
240  See CRA International (2009), p.13. According to the KPMG survey of 2007, a range of European 
banks estimated that their AML compliance costs increased by 58% over the 2004-2007 period. This 
survey also predicts that costs will grow at a slower rate in the following years: indeed European banks 
expect these costs to increase by 27% between 2007 and 2010. This survey underlines the difficulty of 
estimating AML costs as they may be spread across many different functions (operations, compliance, 
risk) or regions, involve direct and indirect costs, and overlap with processes that are embedded in 
normal business practice (e.g. credit risk or customer relationship management). This survey does not 
make a distinction between one-off and on-going costs of compliance. See KPMG (2007), p.14 and seq. 
241  Europe Economics (2009). The survey concentrated on firms from four sectors within the financial 
services industry in the EU: banks and financial conglomerates, asset managers, investment banks and 
financial markets. The six directives concerned are the so-called Prospectus Directive, the Financial 
Conglomerates Directive, the Capital Requirements Directive, the Transparency Directive, the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive – MiFID and the AML Directive. These measures were part of the 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of 1999 (the so-called 3rd AML Directive of 
2005 replaced in the meantime the precedent, second, AML Directive of 2001 which was the measure 
addressed in the FSAP). 
242  Ibid., §2.14. For an explanation of the methodology of this study, see: section 2; the introductions to 
sections 4 and 5; as well as Appendix 1 of the final report. 
243  Ibid., §15 and seq..  
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Figure 6.1: Dispersion of one-off and ongoing costs of the AML Directive (expressed as a percentage of 
































Source: Europe Economics (2009), figure 3. 
A) The one-off costs of compliance 
Concerning the one-off costs of compliance (see Table 6.1) for banks, financial 
conglomerates and investment banks, compliance with the AML Directive roughly accounts 
for 10% of all their financial services regulatory costs.  
TABLE 6.1 – AML Directive – One-off costs of compliance 










244 (percentage of 2007 operating expenses)  0.29%  0.23%  0.21%  0.16% 
Median
245 (percentage of 2007 operating expenses)  0.31%  0.32%  0.24%  0.03% 
Total financial services regulatory compliance 
costs
246 (percentage of 2007 operating expenses) 
2.90%  2.25% 1.58% 3.40% 
       
Mean: average absolute value of the incremental 
cost changes, per firm (€000s) 
4,588 2,507  825 33 
Total financial services regulatory compliance costs 
(€000s)  
45,149 24,569  5,565 694 
Average of operating costs (€000s) 1,558,072  1,030,071  384,582  20,403 
Source: Europe Economics (2009), tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
The difference in cost between banks and financial conglomerates on the one side, and 
investment banks, on the other side, possibly owes to a typically different client make-up
247. 
                                                 
244  The middle value in a series of data points arranged sequentially. The sequence from which this median 
has been selected is based upon the estimated one-off costs of compliance expressed as a percentage of 
the relevant firm’s more recent operating expenditure.  
245  Aggregate one-off costs of compliance expressed as a percentage of the relevant firms’ aggregated most 
recent operating expenditure. This implies that the experience of the larger firms will carry more weight 
in the sample presented. 
246  Including other FSAP measures and other financial services regulation, whether EU, nationally or extra-
territorially derived.  
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The study also notes that in the AML field, firms voluntarily practice standards that are 
applied globally, which adds on to the costs of the AML Directive
248. If a comparison is done 
with the costs of compliance for asset managers, Table 6.1 shows that the one-off costs of 
compliance with the AML Directive take a higher proportion of asset managers’ total costs
249. 
Out of the six directives examined by the study, the AML Directive comes third in terms of 
cost impact for banks, financial conglomerates and investment banks, behind the Capital 
Requirements Directive and MiFID. These two other directives represented the most 
important regulatory changes in this area in recent times and their compliance costs are 
significantly higher
250. It is interesting to note in this regard that the study identifies the 
possibility for firms to achieve synergies between some of the requirements in the AML 
Directive and MiFID: a small number of institutions surveyed did feel that synergies had been 
achieved (or could be achieved) between the “know-your-customer” requirements of the 
AML Directive and suitability tests of MiFID
251. Nevertheless, very few businesses believed 
that any significant cost-reducing synergies had been achieved in the implementation of the 
various measures: the variation in the implementation dates was the most frequently cited 
factor behind this. Another component to this problem was that firms felt that the detail 
necessary to properly prepare for IT changes was not always forthcoming from the 
implementing authorities in a sufficiently timely manner.  
The main source of AML Directive related compliance spending is on IT (see Table 6.2 for 
banks and financial conglomerates and Table 6.3 for investment banks).
252 Similarly high IT 
costs appear for almost all the directives covered. 
TABLE 6.2 – Cost drivers of the selected directives (banks and financial conglomerates) – one-off costs 
Directive Prospectus FCD CRD Transparency MiFID 3AMLD
Familiarisation with Directive  49% 15% 2% 13% 3% 3%
Consultancy fees 5% 11% 20% 5% 13% 11%
Legal advice  2 3 %5 %5 %5 %7 %1 %
Training  1 3 %8 %5 % 1 1 % 1 5 % 2 2 %
Staff recruitment costs 0% 2% 4% 1% 2% 2%
Investment in/updating IT 2% 47% 57% 63% 52% 54%
Project management 8% 9% 8% 3% 7% 7%
Other  0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Source: Europe Economics (2009), table 4.10. 
                                                                                                                                                         
247  Ibid., §4.10. The study also provides further breakdowns of costs, per size and geographical origin. See 
§4.20 to 4.25 and 4.93 to 4.94. 
248  Ibid., §4.12 in fine. The non-EU regulation costs are reflected in the study, on an aggregated basis, in 
the total costs. 
249  Financial markets (e.g. stock exchanges operators) are not directly subject to the obligations of the 
AML Directive. But in order to allow for comparisons, their costs are also shown in Table 6.1. 
250  Ibid., tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. The impact of MiFID costs doubles those of the AML Directive, while 
CRD accounts for more than half of the total financial services regulatory compliance. 
251  Ibid., §§4.14 to 4.17. This is also confirmed by the KPMG survey of 2007. See KPMG (2007), p.53. 
252 See  generally,  Ibid., §§4.57 to 4.62, and §§4.106 to 4.107.  
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TABLE 6.3 – Cost drivers of the selected directives (investment banks) – one-off costs  
Directive Prospectus FCD CRD Transparency MiFID 3AMLD
Familiarisation with Directive  9% 7% 3% 7% 6% 5%
Consultancy fees 13% 0% 19% 10% 16% 12%
Legal advice 18% 10% 2% 4% 4% 6%
Training 14% 15% 2% 4% 10% 13%
Staff recruitment costs 4% 0% 1% 10% 1% 0%
Investment/ updating IT 27% 39% 62% 36% 49% 53%
Project management 14% 29% 10% 29% 14% 12%
Other 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Source: Europe Economics (2009), table 4.27. 
In terms of IT spending
253, this included projects designed to: (i) meet the “Know-Your-
Customer” informational requirements, such as some adaptation of the existing Customer 
Relationship Management systems and/or some new data entry needed to meet these 
increased data capture requirements (in a few instances, this triggered data warehousing 
projects to enhance inter-system data capture); (ii) facilitate increased monitoring of 
suspicious transactions through increased automation of processes
254; (iii) facilitate Politically 
Exposed Persons screening; and (iv) assist in risk assessment.  
Training and (for larger banks) external consultants are also important sources of cost. 
According to this study, the importance of training in the AML field is driven by it being 
more generally applicable than the other Directives: in other words, the breadth of coverage of 
the training believed to be necessary to comply with this measure was greater than for the 
others. There was also some cost associated with the re-design of training programmes and 
the roll-out of these
255. 
These findings are fundamentally not different from those of a different (and qualitative) 
survey conducted in 2007. According to that survey, the drivers of higher expenditure in the 
2004-2007 period appear to be greater expenditure on transaction monitoring capabilities and 
upgrades to existing systems, and the provision of additional tailored training to staff (in that 
survey there was no distinction between one-off and on-going costs).
256 
The study notes that the implementation of the AML Directive remains a work-in-progress. 
Trans-national businesses have typically implemented its provisions on a group basis, either 
using the Directive itself as guidance or the implementation in their own Member State (if it 
had been implemented). Their expectation is, however, that additional expenditure will be 
necessary in the future to get adapted to the requirements of the local transposition. Some 
participants argued that the uneven transposition situation discouraged early adoption
257.  
                                                 
253  Ibid., §§4.58 and 4.59. 
254  A different survey carried out in 2007 by a consultancy firm found that transaction monitoring is the 
single greatest area of AML expenditure for banks. See KPMG (2007), p.16 and 33. 
255  Europe Economics (2009), §§4.57 and 4.60. 
256 Respondent  banks  estimated  the  areas of greatest AML expenditure according to the following 
categories (the ranking is based on a maximum score of 5 for ‘very strong impact’ and a minimum 
score of 1 for ‘no impact’): enhanced transaction monitoring (4.1); greater provision of training (3.4); 
sanctions compliance (3.4); remediation of KYC documentation for existing customers (3.3); 
transaction ‘look-bank’ reviews (3.2); increased external reporting requirements 3.2); introduction of 
global procedures (3.0); more complex account-opening procedure (3.0); and increased internal 
reporting requirements (2.8). See KMPG (2007), p.16. 
257  Europe Economics (2009), §4.62.  
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B) The ongoing cost of compliance 
Concerning the ongoing cost of compliance (see Table 6.4) for banks, financial conglomerates 
and investment banks, compliance with the AML Directive roughly accounts for 13% of all 
their financial services regulatory costs
258. In relative terms, this is a slightly higher figure 
than the one-off cost of compliance, possibly explained by the relatively lower on going costs 
of compliance with the Capital Requirements Directive and MiFID. In any event, as for the 
one-off costs, these two other directives bear the bulk of the compliance costs, with the AML 
Directive ranking third out of the six directives examined by the study. If a comparison is 
done with the ongoing cost of compliance for asset managers, Table 4 shows that the ongoing 
cost of compliance with the AML Directive take a lower proportion of asset managers’ total 
costs, which is explained by the higher ongoing cost incurred by asset managers regarding 
MiFID and Prospectus Directive
259.  
TABLE 6.4 – AML Directive – Ongoing cost of compliance 










260 (percentage of 2007 operating expenses)  0.08%  0.05%  0.07%  0.13% 
Median
261 (percentage of 2007 operating expenses)  0.09%  0.08%  0.07%  0.00% 
Total financial services regulatory compliance 
costs
262 (percentage of 2007 operating expenses) 
0.59%  0.38% 0.85% 1.70% 
       
Mean: average absolute value of the ongoing costs 
incurred, per firm (€000s) 
1,195 464  278  27 
Total financial services regulatory compliance costs 
(€000s)  
8,540 3,807  2,532  347 
Average of operating costs (€000s) 1,558,072  1,030,071  384,582  20,403 
Source: Europe Economics (2009), tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. 
The most important ongoing costs of compliance with the AML Directive concern IT 
expenditure and additional staff costs (see Table 6.5 for banks and financial conglomerates 
and Table 6.6 for investment banks).
263 Most of the IT expenditure is linked to access costs to 
various databases dedicated to the tracking and screening of relevant parties such as 
Politically Exposed Persons, watch lists etc. Whilst some firms (generally larger banks) see 
automation as the only way to provide the necessary evidence of an audit trail to the 
regulatory authorities in the event of problems arising (as well as being cost effective by 
comparison to manual effort), a number of firms have retained significant (or total) human 
oversight in this area.  
                                                 
258  The study also provides further breakdowns of costs, per size and geographical origin. See §§5.12 to 
5.17 and 5.62. 
259  Financial markets (e.g. stock exchanges operators) are not directly subject to the obligations of the 
AML Directive. But in order to allow for comparisons, their costs are also shown in Table 6.4. 
260  The middle value in a series of data points arranged sequentially. The sequence from which this median 
has been selected is based upon the estimated ongoing costs of compliance expressed as a percentage of 
the relevant firm’s more recent operating expenditure.  
261  Aggregate ongoing costs of compliance expressed as a percentage of the relevant firms’ aggregated 
most recent annual operating expenditure. This implies that the experience of the larger firms will carry 
more weight in the sample presented. 
262  Including other FSAP measures and other financial services regulation, whether EU, nationally or extra-territorially 
derived. 
263 See  generally,  Ibid., §§5.34 to 5.40 and §5.69.  
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TABLE 6.5 – Cost drivers of the selected directives (banks and financial conglomerates) – ongoing cost 
Prospectus FCD CRD Transparency MiFID 3AMLD
Additional staff 37% 6% 43% 15% 35% 37%
Internal reporting 2% 7% 8% 4% 7% 4%
IT  15% 6% 26% 49% 28% 31%
External reporting  16% 65% 10% 8% 10% 5%
Training  1 9 %4 %6 %8 % 1 0 % 1 3 %
Audit 10% 11% 7% 15% 9% 10%
Other  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  Source: Europe Economics (2009), table 5.10. 
TABLE 6.6 – Cost drivers of the selected directives (investment banks) – ongoing cost 
Directive Prospectus FCD CRD Transparency MiFID 3AMLD
Additional staff  0% 0% 34% 33% 26% 23%
Internal reporting 0 % 2 3 %7 %7 %6 % 1 2 %
IT 1% 35% 32% 19% 45% 29%
External reporting 48% 12% 10% 8% 13% 9%
Training 47% 31% 6% 12% 6% 16%
Monitoring/audit 3% 0% 10% 21% 4% 10%
Other  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  Source: Europe Economics (2009), table 5.27. 
Ongoing training is not insignificant. However, it is highlighted that once e-learning or class-
based training modules are developed (see one-off costs), the ongoing requirement in cash 
cost terms is mitigated
264. It is also noted that whereas large banks spent proportionately more 
than small ones on training as a one-off cost, the proportion of training within ongoing costs is 
less. This would be consistent with larger banks being more reliant on e-learning and e-
training.
265 
                                                 
264  Interviewees in the study were not in agreement as to whether the AML Directive increased the 
intensity of training required — i.e. whether or not the duration of the training sessions increased or 
were rolled out to a broader set of employees. See Ibid. §5.36. 
265  Some participants remain sceptical about e-learning generally. It is seen by such firms as a “quick fix”, 
in essence allowing maximum access to training for more people in less time. However, these firms 
considered it inevitable that it would require supplementation by more traditional (and more expensive) 
classroom-based approaches. See Ibid. §§5.37 and 5.38.  
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ANNEX 7 – DATA PROTECTION RULES AND AML OBLIGATIONS 
This annex provides a summary of the issues raised by stakeholders in this survey concerning 
the relation between data protection rules and AML obligations. This annex does not aim at 
providing a comprehensive view on this issue. 
Concerning the information on the customer necessary for the customer acceptable policy, 
different rules at national level provide in some cases for different documentation evidence 
(see Part A of Annex 5). Additionally, the risk-based approach in the AML Directive gives 
institutions a large margin of manoeuvre as regards the information to be collected. This 
raises questions among stakeholders as to whether there are limits to the type of information 
that can be circulated within the group or stored at group level. In the same manner as banks 
need to demonstrate to the banking supervisors that the extent of the customer due diligence 
measures is appropriate in view of the risk of money laundering, banks would also need to 
justify to the data protection authorities that the processing in question, involving intra-group 
and cross-border transfer of information, complies with data protection rules, namely the 
legitimacy of the processing and the necessity, proportionality and purpose limitation of the 
processing (i.e. that the collection and further processing of personal data is lawful, necessary, 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which the data was 
collected)
266.  
Regarding the legitimacy of the processing, from the point of view of data protection law, the 
intra-group transfer of persona data within the EU is acceptable if it is grounded on any of the 
specific legal basis provided for in Directive 95/46/EC; for instance it could be argued that the 
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the data 
controller (e.g. the subsidiary) or by the third party (e.g. the parent bank) to whom the data are 
disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject
267. The question raised by stakeholders is whether the 
prevention of money laundering can systematically be considered as being a legitimate 
interest of both institutions implied in the exchange of information. This would be a kind of 
subjective test, based on the needs of the bank. On the contrary, any need to justify these 
legitimate interests on a case-by-case basis, depending on the individual circumstances of 
each particular case, could render any systematic circulation of data within the group or 
record keeping of data at group level impractical. The question of the prevailing interests for 
fundamental rights and freedom of the data subject would also need further examination in 
this regard
268.  
In order to overcome this difficulty, some banks have recourse to standard consent clauses, 
included in the banks' general terms and conditions, which provide for the possibility to make 
intra-group transfer of information. However, this leaves the possibility to undertake this 
processing in the hands of the data subject (who could object to it) or might be subject to legal 
                                                 
266  See Article 6(c) of Directive 95/46/EC.  
267  See Article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC. It is arguable whether the intra-group processing could be 
considered necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the bank is subject (cf. Article 
7(c) of Directive 95/46/EC). 
268  For instance, it could be conceivable that the data subject refuses his/her consent to the processing of 
certain types of personal data on the ground that such processing is not necessary for the purposes of 
complying with the AML obligations. This could be particularly the case in connection to the 
monitoring of the business relation, where the directive rules are vague.  
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challenge on the grounds that the data subject has not unambiguously given his specific, free 
and informed consent)
269. The requirement of respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject that could impede intra-group data flows would also deserve attention.  
The question of the further processing of data
270 has been raised, in connection to the 
customer and transaction monitoring: e.g. are there limits to the central storage of client 
information at group level for the purposes of transaction monitoring by different entities 
within the group in an EU cross-border context? Also, are there limits to the possibility of 
generating (and storing) a global profile of the customer (i.e. across different jurisdictions 
which can be shared intra-group)? In this context, one would need to clarify whether the 
systematic sharing of customer information within the group is compatible with the specific, 
explicit and legitimate purposes initially identified for the collection of data, or whether a 
case-by-case justification would be needed. In the latter case, the customer and transaction 
monitoring at group level might not be practical. 
The use of sanction lists poses particular challenges and leads to legal risks. Banking groups 
would tend to use, at group level, a consolidated list of all national lists applicable to the 
group. However, there may be impediments at national level resulting from national data 
protection safeguards: e.g. this processing may result in blacklisting or could be considered to 
involve the processing of sensitive data such as ethnic origin or religion
271.  
Concerning the intra-group transfer of information on suspicious transactions and on reports 
thereof, a question arises as to whether the absence of prohibition in the national legislation 
transposing the AML Directive is a sufficient legal basis for the transfer of data within the 
banking group from the point of view of data protection rules and whether such intra-group 
transfer of information meets data protection principles of necessity, proportionality and 
purpose limitation. For some Member States AML authorities this would not be clear enough. 
For others, the presumption is that there should not be a problem from the perspective of 
respecting the fundamental right to the protection of personal data. An additional issue raised 
in connection to the processing of suspicious transactions is that the intra-group circulation of 
information or the record keeping at group level should not amount to blacklisting
272. 
                                                 
269  The Basel Committee survey on the implementation of its compliance principles identifies the customer 
consent requirement as a restriction to the information sharing within groups for compliance purposes. 
See Basel Committee (2008), §11 and §§54-61. 
270 " Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes." Cf. Article 6(b) of Directive 95/46/EC 
271  Particular attention should be given in this context to the recent case law of the Court of Justice on the 
lawfulness of restrictive measures taken against individuals by EC Regulations adopted to implement 
sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. The Court of Justice has stressed the need that such 
legal measures respect fundamental rights, namely the fundamental right to judicial protection and the 
right to be heard. (Decision of 3.9.2008, cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P (Kadi) OJ C 285 of 
8.11.2008; p. 2). 
272  In SI, the attempt by a subsidiary of an EU bank to create a database with suspicious information 
connected to money laundering (not necessarily transmitted to the local FIU) and transmit this 
information to the head office was unsuccessful, as a result of the strict domestic legislation not 
accepting the creation of black lists.   
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